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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Degree:

Comparative Assessment of the ISM Code and the
Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA)
impact on the tanker industry
MSc

This study is concerned with the impact of two safety management tools; the first
tool is the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which is a legislative
instrument that is applicable to almost the whole of the shipping industry, the second
management tool is the Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA) guide.
This voluntary guide is an initiative of the Oil Companies International Marine
Forum (OCIMF) that was first published in 2004.
These two management tools are fundamentally different; in addition, TMSA has
built on the implementation of the ISM Code, yet both of them are fundamentally a
safety management standard that has a noticeable difference in approach and
application. These differences are the focus of this study.
This study has been divided into two parts; the first part was largely based on the
literature review for this study. This part contains an analytical discussion on selected
issue related to the topic of this study. This part introduces the fundamentals of safety
management tools, explores the role of key players in the tanker industry and
examines the merits of internal auditing of the ISM Code and the fundamentals of
TMSA, which is the self-assessment exercise.
The second part of this study outlines the methodology and describes the procedures
followed for the data collection for this study, this was based on a questionnaire
designed and distributed in order to attain the industries attitude towards TMSA and
the ISM Code, following the same comparative assessment approach.
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The dissertation closes with conclusions drawn from the investigations of this study
and outlines a number of recommendations on how could the implementation of
safety management standards be improved.
The views expressed in this study are those of the author and not attributed to any
organisation unless otherwise indicated.
KEYWORDS:
Tanker management and self-assessment, TMSA, International Safety Management
Code, ISM, continues improvement. Quality Management System, OCIMF,
INTERTANKO, Tanker Management, Safety Management System.
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Part one
1. Introduction, scope and objectives of the Study

1.1. Introduction

The introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code was
considered a paradigm shift for the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in
terms of its approach to safety standards of shipping. At present, a considerable
sector of shipping companies combine the practical implementation of the Code with
observing the requirements of other voluntary Quality Management Systems (QMS).
Many of these initiatives are industry-based initiatives.
This project is a comparative assessment of the impact of two safety management
tools; the first tool is the ISM Code and the second is the Tanker Management and
Self Assessment (TMSA) guide. This voluntary guide is an initiative of the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) that was first published in 2004.
More projects have attempted to study the impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code
in reducing the number of marine accidents as well as the promotion of a safety
culture. These initiatives covered a range of areas, such as; the United Kingdom
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) recent study titled ‘Effectiveness of the
ISM Code in the UK Fleet and its Influence on the Development of a Safety Culture
in the Commercial Shipping Industry. In that study the MCA concluded that a selfassessment toolkit for assessing the safety culture on non-tanker vessels should be
developed – similar to TMSA. (ReportISM, May 2008a) (Lappalainen, 2008)
Another study of similar nature, which made a reference to the tanker industry
accidents, was a study by Bassiouni (2003) titled ‘The impact of ISM Code on
marine oil spills – Empirical study’. This study concluded that the ISM Code played
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a very small role in decreasing the oil spills and that industry initiatives will play a
dominant part in oil spill prevention and response in the future. (Bassiouni, 2003)

At this time, the wider shipping community had almost 10 years of experience with
the ISM Code, additionally, in the last 5 years a sector of the shipping industry (the
tanker industry) had round about 5 years of experience with a voluntary guide to
management best practices that built upon the ISM Code to further improve on the
quality of management of safety and environment protection. This industry is of
great importance due its considerable size and the sensitivity of its cargo.
Consequently, it is hard to ignore the current level of experience of that important
sector of the shipping industry with these two totally different management tools.
This is worth a closer look and deeper analysis in an attempt to draw up lessons from
the manner in which the shipping industry has reacted to both of these tools and to
comparatively assess the effectiveness of their application.
Studies and experiences show that without “embedding the safety, quality and
maritime environmental protection culture” with in the company, external audits can
have a limited effect on the ship’s safety and prevention of pollution (Turker & Er,
2008), external audits are usually part of a regulatory regime, therefore, drawing up
lessons from this experience is essential to determine how the regulatory instruments
could benefit from the industries confirmation to voluntary management tools.
Furthermore, the author is of the opinion that In the current economic scenario, it is
at least possible that safety standards could suffer from economic downturn, as this
could affect every aspect of safety at sea, from the practical application of safety
measures and standards onboard ships to the safety culture of the whole shipping
company. Some difficulties as a direct result to the current economic downturn has
been highlighted by Koren (2009), a particular reference was made to the charterers
increased freedom and ability to “pick and choose”
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At least, management commitment and the priority of safety management standards
and environmental protection measures could be lowered in favour of cost cutting,
profit maximizing or simply striving to save the company’s mere existence during
the current economic hardship. Hence, deciding on this time to conduct a study on
the impact of two safety management systems on the shipping industry. This could
proactively inspire changes to any weaknesses in the current regime to improve on
safety management of the shipping industry in spite of the current economical
hardship.
A particular key feature of this project, which deserves urgent explanation at this
stage, is the ambiguous attempt recognized in the title of the research topic that is to
compare and evaluate the approach and impact of two entirely different management
tools.
This might lead to the understanding that the author is assuming a relationship
between these two management tools and is attempting to explicate or establish the
existence of this relationship. To the contrary, the aim of this research is not to
establish or explain any connection or link between these two management tools but
to study their current co-existence in a sector of the maritime industry together with
any lessons that could be learned from that reality.
Not withstanding the above, TMSA and ISM are fundamentally different from each
other, while the ISM Code is a legally binding instrument; the TMSA is a guidance
tool. Additionally, the ISM Code is applicable to a much larger sector of the shipping
industry than the current application of TMSA and the current level of experience
with TMSA is only half of that with the ISM Code. A closer look into these
differences will be further discussed in this study.
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However, other than the fact that TMSA has built upon the ISM Code, it is not the
scope of this study to explore this relationship further. If at the end of this study an
actual relationship between some elements of these two management tools is
formulated; it should emerge as a by-product of this research and it is left to the
conclusion of the reader. Establishing an affiliation between the ISM Code and the
TMSA is a problematical workload that exceeds the scope of this study, that is
because establishing such a relationship will require an intensive qualitativequantitative approach which is very resource demanding endeavour.

1.2. Scope of Study

To better understand the comparative nature of this paper, one of the objectives of
this paper is to attempt to answer the question what is the need for TMSA? Why did
a large sector of the shipping industry together with their respective customers feel
the need for a specific guidance to improve on their safety management system
beyond what is called the minimum compliance of ISM.
The focal point of this study will be a focus on TMSA rather than attempting to
compare the two management tools on the same level. Consequently, TMSA rather
than the ISM Code will be the focus of almost every explanatory or descriptive
section of this paper.
The incentive behind this approach is that the vast majority of authoritative
references, such as books, research papers and studies (academic or otherwise) have
been on the ISM Code (details and outcomes of some studies are addressed in this
study). Naturally, due to the previously mentioned differences between the two,
TMSA did not receive consideration in any comparable size, depth or academic
value.
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Additionally, the knowledge and experience of the shipping community with the
ISM Code is wider and deeper than with TMSA. Even shipping companies that have
been confirming to TMSA since its launch, do not have more than 5 years of
experience with it as compared to the almost 10 years they had to comply with the
ISM Code.
A number of studies, such as (Bassiouni, 2003) and (Mejia, 2001), attempted to link
the implementation of the ISM Code to the rate of accidents, oil spills or Port State
Control (PSC) findings or detentions. These studies have commented on the
difficulty to separate the effect of the ISM Code implementation from the effect of
other technical safety measures and regulations. Therefore, since TMSA has built on
ISM Code, it is difficult to quantify the effect of each one of them independently;
hence, this study will only discuss specific elements of these two management tools.
Furthermore, an entire focus on TMSA’s approach and impact alone was not aimed
for. It was not aspired to examine the similarities of these two instruments or any
elements either in objective or in approach they might share, but it was decided that
this study will attempt to explore the distinctive features of the approach of each of
these management tools and to analyse the diversity of their impact on the shipping
industry.
When considering analyzing or assessing a safety management tool, one must
consider a large number of aspects that determines if that management system is
successful or not. Primarily, the objectives of that management system are to be
taken into account.
In order to achieve that, the objectives of the system must be measurable, since a
number of studies (as previously mentioned) have concluded that an assessment of
the impact of the ISM Code on the shipping industry by gathering hard data is
extremely difficult and requires international cooperation, this study will attempt to

15

gauge the impact of the ISM Code and TMSA from the manner in which the industry
have reacted to them and their attitude towards them.
Based on the methodology followed in this approach, as will be further discussed in
part two of this paper, it is the opinion of the author that approaching the assessment
of TMSA in the same manner that the ISM Code was approached in deferent studies,
would be beyond the capabilities of the author or the time allocated for this study and
might at the end lead to the same reported serious limitations in any results achieved.

1.3. Objectives

This paper attempts to investigate the need for TMSA. Was there a weakness deemed
in the ISM Code that TMSA was the remedy for? If true, how effective was the
remedy? On the other hand, if the code itself was considered a sound basis for the
TMSA being a guidance tool, then why did oil majors in particular find it necessary
to place considerable commercial pressure on operators to confirm to this guide?
This project acknowledges the different approaches, application and methodology of
the two management tools. The ISM Code being a legislative tool has taken a certain
approach to set up minimum standards for the safety management of shipping and
introduce what is termed a safety culture.
While the TMSA is documented not to be considered as replacement of the ISM
Code, it builds on it and provide a systematic approach that encourages ship
operators to move beyond the so called minimum compliance culture.
Although these two aims are fundamentally different, in addition to the very different
methodology each tool implies, both of these tools comprise an ambition to improve
the process of safety management based on the theory that if the safety management
standard is raised the safety performance will follow.
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Therefore, this paper aspires to identify the differences between the approaches of
the ISM Code and TMSA, the impact of their implementation and the effectives of
both in improving the safety culture of a company.
By reviewing and analysing the impact of the TMSA on the Tanker industry, since
the ISM Code and the TMSA have been simultaneously applicable to the tanker
industry alone, the commitment, competence and attitudes of individuals at all levels
will be considered.
The reaction of the industry to the introduction of ISM Code is well documented and
studied, similarly, the industries attitude towards the Code has be exploited in a
number of studies. Therefore, this paper is a modest attempt to shed some light on
the reaction of the industry to the introduction of TMSA tool as compared to the
reaction of the industry to the introduction of the ISM Code.
In addition, was the introduction of TMSA the long sought after solution, required by
legislators and the industry alike, to improve the safety management systems of
shipping? If so, how effective was it in attempting that important purpose and what is
the potential of applying this approach to the shipping industry in its entirety?
Finally, better understanding of the current regime may well allow the drawing up of
lessons from the impact that these two tools have had on the shipping industry. This
is in an effort to determine the most suitable path towards a uniform approach that
will ultimately make our ships safer and our environment better protected.

1.4. Overview of methodology

The methodology followed in this paper is not by any means far from the mainstream
of studies that has been conducted on similar areas of study, in particular, studies that
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have been conducted on the ISM Code impact and effectiveness, such as the study
conducted by Anderson (2005).
Individuals in the field of shipping management have already been through the
introduction of ISM Code, some have been through the introduction of TMSA as
well; others have even had almost 5 years of experience with TMSA. This wealth of
experience and practical knowledge is of immense importance to a study that aims to
examine the impact of ISM Code and TMSA.
Previously mentioned studies have pointed out the importance these opinions in
formulating a better understanding of the impact of management tools. This paper
takes that into account, therefore, this paper is divided into two parts; the first part
will initially present and review the subject of this research, discussions and analysis
of topic with large dependence on the literature review conducted.
Part two of this paper will present the results of a questionnaire exercise that was
carried out to formulate a better understanding of the industry’s attitude and reaction
towards the ISM Code and TMSA. Detailed description of all stages in that exercise
together with some basic descriptive statistical analysis of the results achieved will
be presented.

Other opinion polls and benchmarking database, such as the International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) benchmarking
database, have been used as well in this study. This was attempted to formulate a
better understanding of the application status of TMSA. A detailed description of
the methodology is described in chapter 5 of this paper.
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2. Safety Management tools between quality and minimum standards:

Reason (1991) has divided the safety concerns of safety measures and standards into
three eras; the first era is the technical era, the focus then was on improving the
standards of the technical components of the system. However, following major
accidents where the human component of the system was clearly to blame, a clear
shift into improving the standards of human element was realised.
As per figure 1, Reason (1991) defines a third era, where the focus of safety
measures and standards is on the management and organisational structure of the
system.

Figure 1 Three ages of safety concerns

Source: Reason, J. (1991), The Reliability of Management in Decision Making, Seminar
Reliability, The Risk of Management, IMechE, London.

The ISM Code represents a paradigm shift in the attitude of regulators towards safety
standards. This shift is now almost 10 years old; time does play a part in a changing
of the common believe on what constitutes minimum standard and what constitutes
quality, therefore, is the ISM Code only a minimum legislative standard to comply
with or is it a quality system?
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The answer to that question depends on the definition of the term quality. As cited by
AL-Hamran (1999) There are many definitions for the term quality. However, almost
all fall under two categories, the first one entails that quality is achieved if implied
needs are met; the second one involves a measure of how effective these implied
needs are met.
If the first category of definition is considered, the ISM Code requirements sets out a
quality system to differentiate between the good and the bad, i.e. the system is a pass
or fail system where if the Safety Management System (SMS) of a specific company
complies with the provisions of the Code it passes as a quality management system,
otherwise it fails.
On the other hand, considering the second category of definitions, TMSA provides
for a measurement that quantifies how effective was the SMS (or the QMS of the
company) in achieving the conditions of a quality management system. The measure
is based on businesses best practices from the point of view of oil majors.
Never the less, it might be possible to think of the Code as a form of quality
assurance focused on safety requirements rather than commercial requirements
(Bolivar, 1996) because it is the basis of a quality management system to be
formulated by the company based on its specific needs as much as the TMSA is.
The comparison that both management tools are the basis for a company specific
quality management is worthy of evaluation, since the methodology used in both
tools is different. TMSA is built with specific “clear-cut” guidance. These guidelines
are measurable by key performance indicators whilst the ISM Code is a holistic
general approach that should serve as the basis for the specific safety management of
the company.
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The previous discussion and any subsequent comparison ignored some basic facts.
Such as the fact that TMSA has built upon ISM Code, only one sector of the shipping
industry had experience with TMSA and that experience with TMSA is limited in
time as well.
Though, it might not be possible for a legislative instrument to define a quantifying
measure of compliance. In the ISM Code case, any SMS should either comply with
the ISM Code or fail to comply. On the other hand, guidance to the implementation
provides direction towards a uniform interpretation of the code.
Nonetheless, even if the ISM Come implementation guidelines are not legally
binding, and even if they are basically directed to flag states to form a homogeneous
interpretation of the system, these guidelines could be translated into measurable
practical steps to fulfil the legislative ISM Code requirement. This is not suggesting
that the inclusion of a measurement system alone in a safety management tool will
transform it into a more efficient tool.

2.1. Historical background of ISM and TMSA

This historical background examines the motives behind each of the ISM Code and
TMSA; this attempt is to develop a better understanding of the objectives of these
two instruments and what symptoms of failure were these two instruments the
response for.
It is well known that in the mid 1980s there was an explosion in the amount of
maritime insurance claims, a rise of 200-400% in insurance claims was reported.
That claim was combined with a number of maritime accidents were a large number
of lives lost, particularly the capsizing of the Herald of the Free Enterprise in 1987, a
predominant feature of these accident was that human error was a set factor in almost
all of these accidents. Another feature dominated the accident investigation reports;
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the maritime community (legislators in particular) was concerned that there was a
serious lack of a comprehensive management system in regard to organizational
safety. (Anderson, 2005)
With regard to TMSA, the originating body of TMSA is the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF), the role of OCIMF will be further illustrated
later in this study, however, OCIMF is a voluntary association of oil companies
having an interest in the shipment and what is called “terminalling” of crude oil and
oil products.
Although TMSA was promoted as a proactive approach towards safety and as an
industry initiative to be self-governed, there is evidence of other historical
motivations behind the introduction of TMSA.
Starting with The grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967 that was a shock to
the maritime industry, the political system and the public at large. The severe
environmental consequences of the accident marked the beginning of a much
stronger focus on the environmental aspects of shipping, a focus that ever since has
increased in scope and strength. The tragic fact was that this catastrophe was a
wholly human made accident. (Kristiansen, 2005)
Although many safety and environmental protection rules and regulations are
attributed to the grounding of the Torrey Canyon, a more recent trace of increased
public awareness of marine pollution, in particular oil pollution, is attributed to the
sinking of the oil tanker Erika on December of 1999, with the loss of some 20,000
tonnes of heavy fuel oil into the sea, the Erika was charted by the company Total, a
European oil major company, and classed by Rina, which is a European
Classification Society.
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The findings of the French court ruling on the loss of the Erika and resultant
pollution included an implied criticism of the charterer's tanker vetting process
(Knowles, 2008). This implied criticism was towards a voluntary practice, preformed
out of the due diligence of the charterer, that practice was deemed inadequate at
providing the charterer with the best holistic picture of the safety management of the
company in order to make a decision on whether the ship is to be charted or not.

2.2. Making the case for TMSA

As stated on OCIMF’s TMSA website at (http://tmsa2.ocimf-tmsa.com), the “TMSA
programme provides ship operators with a means to improve and measure their own
management systems. The programme encourages ship operators to assess their
safety management systems against listed performance indicators. The results from
these assessments can then be used to develop an improvement plan, using the stages
of attainment described in the programme, to achieve safety and environmental
excellence”
TMSA was promoted as being a tool that is Methodical, systematic and structured in
its approach. Considerable emphasis on the structure of the TMSA was given. Many
vessel operators have already welcomed TMSA due to the benefits it has given them,
as it provides a useful framework for improving their management systems on a
continuous basis. (Allport, 2009) additionally, the TMSA also helps operators
understand what are the expectations of the charterers and vetting inspectors.
Moreover, one of the motives behind the introduction of TMSA is the lack of
confidence of charterers in the certification process of the ISM Code, i.e. if the
certification process will provide an evidence of the “quality” of the implementation
process. ISM may show that a management system is available, but there is no
indication of the quality and content of the system and its effective application
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(Luke, 2005) and TMSA also provides some sort of evidence to the charterer that the
operator is in full compliance with the requirements of the ISM Code. (Allport, 2009)
When examining the objectives of TMSA stated in the guidance itself, as well as the
introduction papers and information papers particularly published by OCIMF, one
can identify a large number of features that are specific in some way to TMSA.
Instead of identifying all of these features (which might be shared with other
initiatives) the author is of the opinion that identifying the features that have been
reported by companies in TMSA seminars, mainly sponsored by Tanker Operator
and INTERTANKO (Some are reported in the list of references), as to their
experience with the guidance is of more practical value. Therefore the following
paragraph will list some features these features.
Many companies have commented on the proactive approach of TMSA, they have
stated that their experience with the guidance have not only encouraged the company
to identify operational risks and lowering them to an acceptable level but also to
move beyond the minimum requirements by providing the company with clear
guidance.
This in turn, should shift the culture of the company from minimum compliance to
meeting the industry expectations and operating in a best practice orientation,
helping the management of the company to aim for excellence in environmental
protection and safety management.
As well, TMSA is based on self-assessment; this is an essential pillar of the
guidance, which also aids the understanding of the nature of the guidance as well as
its orientation. Therefore, the fact that TMSA is a self-motivated business model for
continues monitoring and improvement will be independently addressed later in this
study.
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Nevertheless, two more features of TMSA, more than often, have been reported as of
particular aid to the company, the first feature is that the TMSA was an aid for the
company in it is decision for resources allocation process. This in fact is a product of
the gap analysis part of the guidance; TMSA enables the company to recognize the
level of their conformance to the guidance scores based on the achievement of KPIs.
Thus, enabling the company to identify current gaps between their current level of
conformance and their desired level. That in turn, will serve as a planning tool for the
company to achieve their desired level of conformance where the allocation of
resources is an essential part of the planning process. Recourses can be focused and
directed towards identified areas of weakness. Vessel operators can use their
assessment results to develop a phased improvement plan that improves safety and
environmental performance. (OCIMF, 2008)
The second feature is the encouragement that TMSA encompasses, which serves as
an aid for the company in complying with and confirming to a number of legislative
requirements as well as business standards such as the ISM Code itself, ISO 9001,
14001, 18001, customer quality expectations and the company’s own values and
targets.
From the charterers’ point of view, again based upon charterers’ participation in
TMSA Seminars, TMSA may achieve a standard framework for the assessment of
the safety management system of the company, this is an identified weakness of the
previous vetting regime as it was criticised for providing a momentary “snapshot”
judgement of the tanker operator. The industry saw that there is a need for more
safeguards for vetting and chartering above the both ISM and SIRE. This need arises
from the criticism that tanker operators do not apply requirements of the ISM code
properly. (Turker & Er, 2008)
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2.3. Overview of TMSA and its methodology
The guide itself is in four parts; part one introduces the system, while part two
describes the application of the guidelines and implementation and part three, which
is the heart of TMSA, contains the 12 elements of the TMSA guidelines, they are
listed as follows:
Element 1

Management, leadership and accountability

Element 2

Recruitment and management of shore-based personnel

Element 3

Recruitment and management of vessel personnel

Element 4

Reliability and maintenance standards

Element 5

Navigational safety

Element 6

Cargo, ballast and mooring operations

Element 7

Management of change

Element 8

Incident investigation and analysis

Element 9

Safety management

Element 10

Environmental management

Element 11

Emergency preparedness and contingency planning

Element 12

Measurement, analysis and improvement

Part four of the guidelines contains glossary of key terms and phrases.
Each element contains guidance on best practice structured as follows:
•

The title indicates the fundamental area of management practice

•

The main objective defines the goal to be achieved

•

The supporting paragraphs within the elements explain how vessel operators can
achieve the main objective. These are activities that diligent operators will either
have already included or would wish to include within their management
systems.

•

Each element defines the Aim and KPIs required to meet the main objective,
together with guidance on how this objective should be achieved.

•

Individual KPIs within the elements provide an objective measurement of the
standards currently delivered by the operator’s management system. Vessel
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operators may wish to use the best-practice guidance to achieve the standards
outlined in the KPIs. (OCIMF, 2008)
The methodology of confirming to TMSA is illustrated and self explanatory in figure
2 presented in the guidelines.

Figure 2 TMSA, key steps for the measurement processes

Source: Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) (2008) Tanker Management
and Self Assessment (TMSA) Guide, London, UK.
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2.4. Value of TMSA
The shipping industry has been through three eras where there was a distinctive
culture that dominated each era. According to the guidelines on the application of the
ISM Code, published by the International Shipping Federation and the International
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the first era was dominated by a blame culture, where
the essential theme was to identify failure and then to apportion blame accordingly.
(ICS/ISF, 1996)
The second stage is the culture of compliance where a set of rules and regulations
were prescribed for the industry. In this culture, rules were a mean in them selves and
they provided the means to achieve safety. The third era, which the industry partially
has achieved, but aspirers to achieve in its entirety, is the culture of self-regulation.
The means that provided for this culture have been active in the industry for a long
time, namely the ISM Code. The ISM Code provisions encourage individual
companies to set up their own set of rules and regulations based upon the risks that
have been identified by them. (ICS/ISF, 1996)
This exercise is of great importance because the identification of hazards on vesselby-vessel basis, which is based on the specific risk elements that a particular vessel is
exposed to, is far more beneficial and practical when compliance is to be encouraged.
Essential motivations are the “continuous” learning phase where each company has
to identify risks associated with their operations and develop company, or even
vessel, specific barriers against the realization of such risks.
The problem arises where that actual compliance with the provisions of the code was
the end mean in itself for some in the industry. In other words, some companies had
the same compliance attitude towards the code as they did towards other technical
safety measures. Reportedly, that was because they did not understand the code, did
not see the Code as an opportunity to improve their safety management system or
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they lacked the commitment to do so.
This attitude from some companies was evident in a number of observations, such as
the acquiring of what is called “off the shelf SMS”, as well as the limitations and the
narrow approach of some SMS. Whether or not, this problem still exists in the
shipping industry is debatable depending upon the sector of the shipping industry
examined, i.e. the top performing companies or the bottom end of the spectrum.
On the other hand, the developers of TMSA are certainly of the opinion that it does.
The support for such a claim is that many experts see that two essential aspects
where missing in the implementation of the ISM Code, the first one; is the need for
continues improvement and the second one is the genuine commitment from the
senior management, TMSA was considered as the missing link for the needed
upgrading of the “compliance-based” ISM Code, fully in line with the self regulation
culture, as predicted by ISF/ICS (Sagen, 2007). Operators, who have implemented
ISM, in its true spirit, will find at least the first 2 stages of TMSA very parallel to
their current ISM applications. (Turker & Er, 2008)
Nonetheless, TMSA scores do not encompass the findings from other sources. Even
though these findings are usually lagging indicators of the safety condition of the
company or the ship, they are still valuable indicators. These indicators include,
Inspections results, terminal reports, PSC detentions and incident history.
The charterer needs to obtain this information from other channels in order to make
an informed business decision based on leading and lagging indicators (TMSA is
seen as encompassing many leading indicators). Other immediate sources are the
Ship and Barge Inspection Report Exchange (SIRE) inspection reports, which are
readily visible to charterers on OCIMF’s website.
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2.5. Features of the tanker industry
Exploring the motivation behind TMSA is the same as studying the drive for a
quality service in the industry. It is a general view that the majority of the world’s
fleet are safely management; it is the minority that is of concern to regulators as well
as charterers. This minority is significant in number and a single accident could have
very serious consequences, especially to the tanker industry. These serious
consequences will take either the form of public opinion pressure and most of the
time subsequent political pressure. In addition, the financial liability arising from a
single accident is enormous. Commercial reality and pressure, reputation of the
charterer as well (protection) of the reputation of the charterers are a basic motive
behind the introduction of the vetting program and subsequently the introduction of
TMSA.
There are many considerations, other than TMSA level, that are taken into
consideration when making a chartering decision by the oil majors. However, it is
understandable that as the exposure to the charterer increases they are looking for a
higher level of conformance. The exposure will increase by spot charter or short
term, medium term and long term time charter.
Taking a snapshot at the tanker industry performance in terms of accident, according
to the maritime accident review of 2008 published by the European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA, 2008), the total number of accident involving tankers of all types
rose from 63 accident in 2007 to 73 accident in 2008 which equated to 11% of the
total number of accident (as compared to 8% in 2007). Similarly, the number of lives
lost in 2008 rose to 9 from the reported 3 cases of 2007. A comparison between the
tanker industry and other industries is illustrated in figure 3.
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one or two each month during 2008 which were
significantly worse than the rest, and these are
highlighted in Chapter 2.

1.3 Breakdown

by Ship Type

2008 Accidents by Ship Type
9%
11%
18%

41%
11%

8%

General Cargo Ships
Tankers
Container Ships
Passenger Ships
Fishing Vessels
Other Vessel Types

surprise that this was also
category for shipping accid
EU waters in 2008, with alm
EU vessel accidents recorded
45% in 2007). General carg
for almost 77% of the cargo
while bulk carriers account
and vehicle carriers for aroun
proportion of general carg
bulk and vehicle carriers, a
gt range and the majority
involved in collisions/contac
which accounted for aroun
the accident total in this ca
(down from around 40% and

The figures showed 307 carg
accidents in 2008 (down from
Note: percentages per vessel type have been rounded down, hence the total of 98%.
also recorded that 10 gener
(in comparison with 11 in 2
Figure 3 EMSA maritime
2008
1.3.1accident
Cargoreview
Shipsof(General
Cargo Ships,
vehicle
carriers went down.
Bulk Carriers
Vehicle
Source: EMSA (2008). Maritime
Accident and
Review
2008. Carriers)
European Maritime Safety
Agency
accidents on cargo ships (u
(EMSA). Retrieved August 1, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
The number of accidents in
The cargo ships category includes general and
https://extranet.emsa.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=159&
refrigerated cargo ships, bulk carriers and vehicle
vessels was very small.
Itemid=193.

2.6. Key players in the tanker industry and TMSA
OCIMF deserves to be the first key player to be discussed in the context of this
study; its mission, as stated on (http://www.ocimf.com/), is to be the foremost
authority on the safe and environmentally responsible operation of oil tankers and
terminals, promoting continuous improvement in standards of design and operation.
OCIMF was formed at a meeting in London on 8 April 1970 and currently comprises
72 companies worldwide, it reported that more that 900 operators are registered in
the OCIMF-TMSA website
The SIRE program is controlled by OCIMF. All companies’ input/extract factual
8 | Summary of the 2008 Results

ship inspection reports (SIRE) from OCIMF database, there is no indication of pass,
fail, rating or other assessment of ship acceptability provided in the database. Ship
operator can make comments on each report and submit these to SIRE where then
they become part of the report that is accessible to OCIMF members, Bulk oil
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terminal operators, Tanker charterers and oil traders and Government bodies. Figure
4 demonstrates the size, frequency and development of the SIRE program.

Figure 4 SIRE reports received and requested per month

OCIMF (2009, June). OCIMF annual report 2009. Retrieved August 1, 2009, from the
World Wide Web: http://www.ocimf.com/view_document.cfm?id=1289.

Although schemes of vetting processes vary from company to company, as well as
with in the same system due to company size, scope, diversity of activities, attitude
to marine risk, use of real time information, quality of analysis and the use 3rd party
vetting, According to (Luke, 2005) from Chevron Shipping, the most common
reason for rejecting vessels is perceived management and compliance weaknesses
within a company, not vessel-specific equipment “Deficiencies”.
The second key player is INTERTANKO, INTERTANKO is the International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners established in the 1970’s; it is a forum,
which comprises 270 members, operating 3100 tankers and some 300 associate
members. Membership is open to independent owners and operators of oil and
chemical tankers, i.e. non-oil companies and non-state controlled tanker owners.
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The support and size of membership of INTERTANKO allows it to issue statements
on behalf of the industry and participate in international meetings and forums, it is
represented in the IMO where it has a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)
status, the International Oil Spill Compensation Fund (IOPC) and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) where it has a consultative status
as well.
INTERTANKO passes the recommendation of its members through TMSA working
group within INTERTANKO and as a result some changes to the 2008 edition of
TMSA has been based upon these recommendations. This establishes that there is a
dialogue between the oil majors and tanker operators at least on an organisational
level.
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3. Practical application & impact of TMSA and ISM

Many tanker operators still misunderstand TMSA, it seems, seeing it the same way
as they saw all the other initiatives (ISM, ISO), with more procedures and forms to
complete, more inspections and proving things have been done, while the ships are
operated similarly to before. (Tanker Operator, 2006a).
It could be argued that the need to introduce the ISM Code arose from the number of
incident where root causes lies in the management practices of the company that
either have encouraged a failure of the system or that the system did not offer enough
barriers to protect against failures, consequently, the ISM Code was introduced to
achieve those results.
Subsequently, Port State Control (PSC) inspectors had at their disposal a legislative
tool through where they could then inspect the management system rather than just
going around the ship counting hardware deficiencies or the carriage of correct
certificates onboard.
Nonetheless, looking at TMSA development, the system of inspections was already
in place, oil majors were practicing their due diligence to select an operator of a
certain quality by carrying out an inspection of the ship. Currently, the results of the
self-assessment will be considered alongside the ship inspection report the decision
to accept or reject an operator will not be entirely based upon a snap picture
judgment as the leading indicators recommended by the TMSA guidelines provide
sufficient information to assess the risk associated with use of those operators’
vessels. (Allport, 2009)
They (the Key Performance Indicators KPI of the guidelines) also provide a valued
determination of whether they have effective control processes implemented, not
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only to justify acceptance for spot or term business, but also to deliver a sustained
level of safety and environmental excellence. (Allport, 2009)

3.1. Application to shore based management

Confirming to TMSA is an immense undertaking that requires the company to
measure, collect evidence and confirm to some 250 Key Performance Indicators.
However, the majority of these tasks needs to be completed only once, after that the
TMSA cycle of continues improvement (which will be discussed later in this study)
will begin and the company should realise the benefits of identifying areas of
weakness, decide in actions to be taken to correct these weaknesses and then
monitoring the effects of these actions.
The industry realises that TMSA is a guideline that does not necessary mean the best
for every company in every case. According to Mittal (2007) it should be
remembered that these are guidelines based on commonly perceived ‘good
management practices ’. These may not necessarily be the ‘best’ depending on the
individual company’s needs and limitations. Some are therefore subject to individual
interpretation (Mittal, 2007). Whether the charterers’ selections process and
subsequent commercial pressure takes that into account is very much debatable.
Operationally, SIRE reports and TMSA submitted reports are both examined by the
charterers of TMSA for any inconsistencies or differences observed, if vetting
inspectors carry out their inspections based upon the results of submitted TMSA
reports then this might undermine the whole process of self-assessment.
While senior management practically decision on the targeted level for each element
is greatly influenced by the business needs of the company it is hard to say that the
TMSA is a concept that is exclusively driven by core values of the company.
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In addition, the decision to raise the level of a TMSA element might also be
motivated by the desire of bringing this element to the same score as other TMSA
elements. This is to achieve an even score across all TMSA elements, as the elements
with a lower score will definitely standout. The same could be applied to KPIs within
the element.
Although some reportedly high scores have been entered in TMSA’s website, the
industry eventually came to the understanding that this was not helpful. Some other
companies have stretched their resources and aced towards confirming to TMSA due
to the market reward attached to the confirmation to TMSA, others reported that the
process have taken up to one year. NYK Shipmanagement reported that 2 Senior
Executives were involved in the process for 9 months.
According to (Anderson, 2005) there was a common complain with regard to the
implementation of the ISM Code, this complain was the size of the paper work that
the ISM Code requires and generates. TMSA did not escape such comments as an
analysis presented by Ulysses Systems (UK) Ltd. demonstrated the increase in paper
requirement for different initiatives (legal and voluntary). (Tanker operator, 2006b)
Table 1 demonstrates the suggested increase in paperwork and administrative
requirements in management tools as illustrated in a 2006 TMSA conference report
(associated presentations).
Table 1 Evolution of the information revolution

Description

ISM

ISO9000

ISO14000

ISPS

TMSA

Total

Tasks

1200

+100

+100

+50

+20

1470

Roles

35

0

0

0

0

35

Manual Sections

2000

+500

+500

+ 150

+150

3300

Forms Types

170

+20

+10

+10

+20

230

Source: Tanker operator (2006a). TMSA warmly received in Athens. In TMSA Conference
Athens. Retrieved June 19, 2009, from the World Wide Web:
http://tankeroperator.com/pdfs/TMSAAthens.pdf.
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3.2. The benchmarking process
Benchmarking is defined as the process of comparing organizational performance
and practices with others, preferably leaders in the same industry, for the purposes of
identifying, understanding and adapting best practices from organizations anywhere
in the world to help your organization improve its performance (OCIMF, 2008)
Benchmarking is specifically mentioned in the following elements:
•

Element 1A, KPI of Stage 4 reads: Benchmarking is used to identify further
improvements to the safety management system.

•

Element 10 Environmental management, KPI of stage 4 reads: Environmental
performance is benchmarked across the fleet and against the oil/marine industry
as a whole.

INTERTANKO has established a benchmarking database (accessible to members at
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx) for member companies to use in
order to compare their KPI scores with other INTERTANKO members participating
in the scheme. Examining this database could provide an idea on the status of
confirmation to TMSA in the industry among members of INTERTANKO
participating in the benchmarking scheme. The general picture of confirmation to
TMSA was grouped by the author and provided in figure 5.
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Figure 5 INTERTANKO benchmarking database as of 20th Aug 09

Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx

Assessing the data provided by INTERTANKO and examining the extremes at both
ends, the following observations were made:
Element 4B received the lowest average rating (2.33), lowest median (2) and the
largest number of companies with rating 1 entries which represent 22% among all
entries, it also received the least number of entries as rating 4 representing 12% of
total entries for that element as per figure 6.
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Figure 6 Element 4B ratings

Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx

Element 4B is titled “Reliability and maintenance standards (Critical equipment)”.
The aim of this element is Testing and planned maintenance of critical systems and
equipment are always carried out as per the plan. Nonetheless, examining associated
elements (elements of similar requirements), i.e. element 4 and 4A, it is observed that
a different trend is shown in the conformance level to these elements. See Figure 5.
The previous observation is worth noting when the requirements of section 10.3 and
10.4 of the ISM Code “Maintenance of the ship and equipment” is considered, this
section of the ISM Code states that:
10.3 The Company should establish procedures in its safety management
system to identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational
failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The safety management
system should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the
reliability of such equipment or systems. These measures should include the
regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or technical systems
that are not in continuous use.
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10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to in
10.3 should be integrated into the ship's operational maintenance routine.
On the other hand, elements 11 and 11A have scored the highest average score (3.67)
& (3.53) respectively, they are the only two elements with where the median is a
rating of 4 and more than 72% of entries have submitted a rating of 4 as
demonstrated in figure 7 and figure 8 respectively.
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Figure 7 Element 11 ratings

Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx
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Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx

Element 11 is titled “ Emergency preparedness and contingency planning” which
aims to improve and test the vessel operators’ ability to respond to and manage an
incident. Element 1A shares same title but aims to improve and test the ability of
vessel operators to respond to an incident by holding regular and realistic emergency
drills and exercises.
Taking a holistic view over the previous data, it is noticeable that the overwhelming
majority of 75 % of self-assessments are in rating 3 and 4.
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Figure 9 Majority of ratings

Source: INERTANKO (2009). Retrieved August 20, 2009 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/TMSA2.aspx

3.3. Commercial impact
TMSA has created a market reward for quality in safety and environmental
management, this is necessary to move beyond that culture of mere compliance and
create yet another strong motive for management to invest in safety and environment
protection. Similarly, due to the benefit of confirming full conformance to ISM, the
potential for significant cost reductions and the increased earnings from improved
commercial opportunities. (Allport, 2009)
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On the other hand, this is a fragile process where the motive to invest in safety
management depends on how much are the oil majors welling to pay for quality, this
in turn will determine how much operators will spend on quality. Whether TMSA
will eliminate the market of substandard ships or drive them towards other sectors of
the market, which oil majors do not control, is debatable.
If the senior management is not focused on improving quality by determining and
allocating recourses then the whole exercise will turn into a number filling contest.
Because TMSA achieves measurable cost reductions, confirms ISM Code
conformance and increases commercial opportunities (Allport, 2009). Oil
companies’ use the score of the TMSA to establish the operator’s rating and
determines the quality of services the shipping company is likely to provide, this is
translated in real life as a commercial pressure by the.

Although confirming to TMSA might represent an initial cost, mainly personnel
training costs as reported by many operators, as well as time investment from senior
management, this could be worth while if the picture matures and as reported that by
recognising the benefits of TMSA, a number of Oil Majors have signalled that they
would like to do away with vetting inspections, although to date they all still carry
them out. (Allport, 2009)

3.4. Legal impact

The legal implications of the ISM Code are enormous; the Code will have a
significant impact on the way in which a carrier’s liability is assessed in the event of
a casualty, or where there is loss or damage to cargo. (Anderson, 2005) Naturally, the
voluntary guide of TMSA would not have comparable legal impact on either
operators or charterers. However, considering the legal impact of TMSA with regard
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to the carrier’s liability and the charterer’s due diligence requirement; selected
aspects of the TMSA legal implications are described here.
With reference to TMSA and on the operator side, members of INTERTANKO have
raised a concern that they might be taking on a higher liability when confirming to
TMSA. The concern is based on the consideration that by submitting the TMSA
score to the charterer they might be “relieving the charterer of some exposure in the
event of an incident.
Since marine accidents have created an inspection industry that is heavily controlled
by oil majors in order to limit their liability (8), INTERTANKO produced a TMSA
liability clause that members can include and point out to the charterer to eliminate
any possibility that the submission of TMSA score might be interpreted as a notion
of reliving the charterer from his duties by agreeing to release their TMSA data to
him.
The TMSA liability clause reads: “The information contained herein is provided to
the best of owner’s/manager’s knowledge and in good faith, however, the accuracy
of the information is not guaranteed either expressly or by implication and
owners/managers exclude liability for any errors or omissions whether caused
negligently or otherwise.”(INTERTANKO, 2005)
According to Tan (2006), while it is difficult to attach liability to classification
societies on their inspections, TMSA and the vetting process may face such a
liability; TMSA and the vetting program are helpful in removing the market for
substandard tankers. Such vetting programs (as complemented by TMSA) may
themselves prove to be a source of liability for charterers. (Tan, 2006)
In holding a charterer –defendant to a particular standard of care, courts of law may
examine whether vetting have been properly conducted and recommendations
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adhered to. A failure to meet such industry standards may thus be constructed as a
lack of due diligence on the charterers part, therefore, Courts could (and should)
impose liability on the charterer is a spill is resulted from the chartered vessel. Such a
liability will have a positive impact on the charterer and the operator. (Tan, 2006)
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4. Internal Auditing vs. Self Assessment
Internal auditing of the ISM Code and the self-assessment of TMSA are two totally
different exercises; yet, they are both an exercise where the main objective is to
assess the level of compliance (or conformance) to the concerned safety management
tool. The following discussion is aimed at exploring the different approach of both
exercises and their potential benefit to the safety management of the company.
The ISM Code in section 12 requires the company to carry out internal safety audits
to verify whether safety and pollution-prevention activities comply with the safety
management system. In addition 12.2 requires the company to periodically evaluate
the efficiency of and, when needed, review the safety management system in
accordance with procedures established by the Company. As well as requiring that
audits and possible corrective actions be carried out in accordance with documented
procedures.
Kristiansen (2005) sets out the audit process as illustrated in figure 10 but then
comments on the Guidelines on Implementation of ISM that it is fairly vague on how
to verify that a safety management system (SMS) conforms with the Code. It (the
guidelines) admits that certain criteria for assessment are necessary, but also warns
against the emergence of prescriptive requirements and solutions prepared by
external consultants.
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Figure 10 The Audit process

Source: Kristiansen, S. (2005), Maritime Transportation – Safety management and Risk
Analysis, Elsevier, Amsterdam

Nevertheless, Kristiansen (2005) comments that one potential problem in terms of
auditing compliance with the ISM Code is that the Code itself and the SMS
documents, which establish the basis for the audit, are fairly general and open to
subjective evaluation.
On the other hand, with regard to TMSA, INTERTANKO believes that the system of
self-assessment can be relied upon to be successful and assist in the reduction of
multiple inspections. This is an aim that every ship owner aspires for, the reason is
that by reduced inspections time utilisation of the vessel can be maximized and
consequently profit margins as well.
In order to achieve that, the process must be transparent and there should be a
uniform interpretation of the self-assessment results across oil majors. However, it is
suggested that if every oil company uses different criteria for practically assessing
the self assessment by examining data such as detention history, PSC findings and
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incidents history, the efforts for transparency in the market will be hampered by
confusion on the part of shipping operators.
Nonetheless, since TMSA has build upon the ISM Code, Internal audit is part of
element 12 of TMSA; this element requires the vessel operators to carry out internal
audits to verify that both vessel and shore-based staff are consistently following the
management system. Audits should be made of all vessels under fleet management
and of all onshore support functions. (OCIMF, 2008)

4.1. Present structures
The industry saw that there is a need for more safeguards for vetting and chartering
above the both ISM and SIRE. This need arises from the criticism of the
requirements of the ISM code not being applied properly by tanker operators.
(Turker & Er. 2008) The present structure of applying self-assessment and how
charterers and operators use it will bring along a better understanding of the
“practical” advantages of performing self assessment to both charterers and
operators.
The self assessment exercise is not relied upon exclusively in the chartering decision,
this in fact encourages self assessment as when Oil Majors screen vessels for
potential service, make an evaluation from their databases of lagging indicators, in
order to confirm that the standard of performance matches the operator’s self
assessment. (Allport, 2009)
Nevertheless, The vetting process excludes a considerable number of tankers from
being considered for business with oil majors. According to Dan (2006) of British
Petroleum Group, the total world fleet is 12,500 tankers, out of which the oil majors
are interested in about 5,000. Of these only about 3,500 ships are acceptable to the
BP Group (Dan, 2006)

48

TMSA guidance places considerable emphasis on the value of self assessment with
regard to the exercise being a “true” self assessment. Users will learn most and
derive the most benefit when personnel directly involved in the activity carry out the
self assessment exercise.
Whilst initiatives such as TMSA can help with successful running of an SMS it was
apparent that a good SMS was achievable with minimum financial investment
provided there was the necessary commitment from senior management and all those
involved in the implementation process. (Anderson, 2008a)
However, it could be argued that the internal audit process is of immense importance
due to the limitations that the external audit is subject to. This is because the depth at
which some Administrations or their Recognised Organisations actually go into the
SMS, in the very limited time allowed during the external audit is so shallow as to
allow nothing more than the most cursory overview. (Anderson, 2007)

4.2. Safety Culture

Whenever the ISM Code has been the subject of a study, the organisational safety
culture is discussed as well. That is because introducing “or enhancing” the
organisational safety culture is at the core of the ISM Code. There are many
definitions for a safety culture but the most uncomplicated definitions of the safety
culture is” Safety culture reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perception and values that
employees share in relation to safety”. (Lappalainen, 2008)
However, reseloution A.913(22) states that the application of the ISM Code should
support and encourge the development of a safety culture in shipping. Success
factors for the development of a safety culture are, inter alia, comintment, values and
beleifes. (IMO, 2002)
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Nevertheless, in the context of the following discussion, safety and quality are two
sides of one coin; Kristiansen (2005) supports this view, he commented that safety
and quality could be seen as synonymous in shipping.
Nevertheless, shipping companies operate in watertight compartments with authority
concentrated at the top. Therefore commitment from the top management towards
safety “Quality” requirements must be assured in order to gradually change this
perception (AL-Hamran, 1999). Management commitment in the ISM Code is
essential to its success that is realised if the SMS of the company reflects the
requirements of the ISM Code in letter and spirit. The relationship and interaction
between safety culture and safety management is illustrated in figure 11.
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Figure 11 Interactions between safety culture, safety management and operations

Source: Lappalainen, J. (2008). Transforming maritime safety culture- Evaluation of the
impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture in Finland. Centre for maritime studies,
University of Turku.

The described interaction (taking safety and quality into consideration) is a product
of what is called Total Quality Management system (TQM). As cited by Lappalainen
(2008), TQM is a concept that was developed in the 1980s, developed by Joseph M.
Juran and Deming in 1986. This concept is based upon the proposal that the
company’s performance is based on an ideal organizational culture, which is a
product of the commitment to produce quality and high productivity for the
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organization productivity of the company. (Lappalainen, 2008)
With regard to TMSA, safety culture is defined as a philosophy promoting safety as
the ultimate consideration for all company personnel and applied to all activities
undertaken, both ashore and at sea. (OCIMF, 2008), the emphasis in that definition
was on safety as a philosophy. Additionally, the scope of this philosophy should
include operations ashore and at sea, but it is hard to ignore that TMSA
encompasses, in addition, customer quality requirements as well. In other words, the
customers (based upon their expectations) originate the basis of this philosophy.
It could be argued that the success of the customer’s expectations is based upon their
actual knowledge of the ideals of that philosophy. Based upon the author’s
experience, since many oil majors control their own fleet as well, it is a fact that
many of them are not short of experience in formulating ideals of performance.
Adding to that the previously described between customer and operator, this
philosophy can only improve.
Keeping the contribution of the ISM Code in mind, TMSA guidelines acknowledged
the contribution of the ISM Code to the promotion of safety culture. The guidelines
state that the management and operation of vessels within a culture of safety and
environmental excellence was formalised with the introduction of the International
Safety Management (ISM) Code. (OCIMF, 2008)
The ISM Code requires vessel operators to implement a safety management system
that will help them to achieve “ideally” incident-free operations. However, there is a
clear distinction between the standards of those vessel operators that embrace the
spirit of the ISM code and those that aim to fulfil only its minimum requirements.
This variability may result in a charterer with due-diligence concerns having to
assess the operational standards of individual vessel operators. (OCIMF, 2008)

51

Additionally a number of KPIs are dedicated towards promoting safety culture within
the organisation.
Although TMSA and ISO Standards are different, they are both implemented in
many tanker operators’ companies. ISO and TMSA share the view that they are
quality standards as opposed to minimum safety standards of the ISM Code.
Therefore, although the primary purpose and objects of the ISM Code and the ISO
standards are different, there are so many common features that there are good
possibilities to merge the safety management systems, quality management systems
and environmental management systems into one integrated management system in a
shipping company. (Lappalainen, 2008)
In addition, the difference between the TMSA and ISM Code show its self upon
guidance where TMSA not only provides the objectives to be achieved but also gives
detailed guidelines through key performance indicators to achieve them. These
guidelines are not vague but quite certain, almost leaving any room for possibilities
of circumventing them. (Turker & ER, 2008)
As well, as cited by Mejia (2001), commenting on the ability to quantifibly measure
the performance of safety management, Mitchison and Papadakis (1999) emphasize
that while safety performance measurement is useful in describing the present state
of a safety management system, it is even more useful as a basis for improving the
system’s performance, i.e., by identifying weaknesses and targeting necessary
interventions.
The motivation that drives adoption of a safety culture is worth of consideration,
although complying with legislation is a big part of the motivation behind complying
with the requirements of the ISM Code. It is not the threat of punishment, which
should drive the industry to achieving higher standards, but a genuine desire to work
as a responsible industry. (Turker & ER, 2008)
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4.3. Continuous improvement cycle
Continues improvement is an essential part of confirming to TMSA, yet, it is evident
that the concept of continues improvement was not an invention of TMSA, indeed,
within section 9 of the ISM Code is a concept of continually improving the SMS of
safety onboard by learning from accidents or events which nearly became accidents
(Anderson, 2003). However, this continues improvement concept is reliant on
“something” happening, either an actual accident or a near miss. Anderson (2005)
illustrated continues improvement cycle of the ISM Code as shown in figure (12).
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Figure 12 A cycle of continual improvement

Source: Anderson, P. (2005), Cracking the Code – The Relevance of the ISM Code and its
impacts on shipping practices, The Nautical Institute, London.

Compared with TMSA, the scheme of the continues improvement concept of the
ISM Code is different from that of the TMSA, the ISM Code concept of continues
improvement is based upon learning from past experiences. Additionally, the
continues improvement is also a product of the actions required by the management
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system. Namely the Plan, Do, Check and Act, Some times referred to as the PDCA
cycle illustrated in figure (13).
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Figure 13 PDCA Cycle

Source: Lappalainen, J. (2008). Transforming maritime safety culture- Evaluation of the
impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture in Finland. Centre for maritime studies,
University of Turku.

In addition, according to Kristiansen (2005), with reference to the TQM, the
continues improvement cycle is a basis for the philosophy of quality in TQM, he
organizational safety level can be managed through the use of a set of basic safety
management activities. These activities may be modelled in a ‘safety management
spiral’ illustrating safety management as an activity of continuous improvement.
(Kristiansen, 2005), once more, the philosophy of ‘quality’ is a product of
management action as illustrated in figure 14.
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Figure 14 Safety management spiral

Source: Kristiansen, S. (2005), Maritime Transportation – Safety management and Risk
Analysis, Elsevier, Amsterdam

On the other hand, the scheme of continues improvement concept in TMSA is based
upon improving the achieved score. This continues improvement concept of TMSA
could be considered as a third element of improvement, if the first two elements are
the Systems audits and hazardous occurrences reporting and corrective actions
elements of the SMS. However, that is not far from the ‘safety management spiral’
illustrated from TQM.
TMSA comments on continues improvement by stating that leadership at all levels is
an essential part of any improvement process. The building blocks of effective
leadership are clarity in describing desired targets and strategic vision, direction,
communication, trust, commitment and reinforcement. Leadership provides
alignment to strategies, strong direction for staff and continuous improvement in
individual and collective results. The continuous-improvement cycle aims to deliver
improvements through a company’s management system. (OCIMF, 2008)
The following text illustrates the scope of TMSA in continually improving the SMS,
emitted from the first edition of the guidance; the 2004 guidance states that the
quality-assessment process is central to the TMSA program. In figure15, it is
illustrated that the outer circle combines the ISM code with the requirements of ship
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operators and industry guidance. The inner circle represents the ship operator’s
management system, indicating its compliance with the requirements of the ISM
code, and a continuous-improvement cycle. (OCIMF, 2004)

Figure 15 Continues improvement cycle of TMSA (2004)

Source: Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) (2004) Tanker Management
and Self Assessment (TMSA) Guide, London, UK.

Evidently, element 12 of the guide is dedicated to continuous improvement, the aim
is for vessel operators to establish KPIs to measure their quality management
system’s effectiveness in meeting the organisational goals and regulatory
responsibilities. (OCIMF, 2008) Even though stage 4 is the highest “score” for any
given KPI within the guidance, stage 4 is not the ultimate objective because
continual improvement is the very foundation of TMSA. (Turker & ER, 2008)
Weather this difference in scheme or concept is of practical value is debatable,
because since TMSA is based on the ISM Code, then the provisions of section 9 of
the Code are incorporated in TMSA. In addition, internal auditing of SMS, or indeed
the external audit, could be considered as an improvement mechanism for improving
the SMS.
Nevertheless, it is apparent (to the author) that there is a third paradigm to the
continues improvement of TMSA, that is the improvement to the guidelines and its
associated KPIs based on the experience of the industry with these guidelines, only a
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positive and active dialogue between operators and charters (on an organisational and
strong representation basis) will be capable of such an achievement.

4.4. Future prospects
Naturally, as previously discussed, one advantage of a voluntary guidance such as
TMSA, is its ability to change without too many constraints in response to changes in
the business best practice or as the experience of the operators from confirming to
this guide expands. The dialogue between the operators and OCIMF as well as the
benefits to the guidance itself and the industry resulting from that dialogue has been
discussed earlier.
Adding to that, TMSA has seen an important development in the form of the new
edition being published; this is because this edition:
•

This edition demonstrated that there is an active dialogue between operators
and charterers.

•

Proved development of business best practice based on the industry
experience.

•

Enlarged the scope of the guidelines application to include all tankers,
including small costal vessels and barges.

OCIMF deputy director Captain Mike Sitts went as far as to describe the original
programming as “primitive” in comparison. (Fairplay 2008, July 17) Moreover, in
order to provide a clear and specific picture of these enhancements, appendix (A)
TMSA 2004/2008 Gap Analysis, prepared by INTERTANKO details the changes to
TMSA in its second edition. Whether in the future, TMSA will continue to be
updated both in scope and application will remain to be seen.
Going back to when TMSA was first launched, it represented a challenge to some
operators, then again, new challenges will continue to emerge. As an example, the
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new wave entering the market are more environmentally friendly than existing
tankers especially in line with the Energy Efficiency and Fuel Management
guidelines published by OCIMF. The concern will be, if that will give new tankers
an advantage over older ones, or charterers vetting procedures will accommodate
such differences. Yet, challenges are also associated with opportunities. Success
factors may include timing, creativity and technology developments. (Koren, 2009)
Furthermore, it is reported that non-tanker operators are considering TMSA; they are
increasingly buying into the best practice generated by TMSA. (Anderson, 2008b)
OCIMF director Phil Davies stated that some members with mixed fleets are using
TMSA as a general management tool for other ship types, based on that only the
cargo-specific aspects of the assessment are unique to tanker operators. (Fairplay
2008, July 17) as well, it appears that bulk carrier operators and owners are now
beginning to use the scheme as a means of assessing their own safety management
systems. (Anderson, 2008b)
On a whole new level, Other initiatives such as the InterManager initiative, which is
an attempt to publish a set of KPI’s common to all ships in a database, possibly
owned by IMO. This database might be web based, ship-owner or manager will enter
individual ship data, other data will be entered direct from other sources such as Port
State Control findings, this will allow ship-owners to measure the improvement of
their ship’s performance globally or against other in similar categories such as flag.
At the end of the day ship-owners might eventually be forced to show their score
cards in order to be fixed for cargo.
Nevertheless, with reference to the three cultural eras prescribed in the ISF/ICS
(1996) guidelines, it seems (to the author) that the industry is heading towards a new
era, a period that will be dominated by performance evaluation and measurement, not
just mere compliance with legislative regulations. Initiatives such as the TMSA
could be the start signal of this era.
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Part two

5. Methodological procedure and Data collection
5.1. Description

As described in earlier chapters of this study, the impact and the industry’s attitude
toward the ISM Code has been covered extensively in various types of studies.
Comparably, TMSA has not been covered to the same degree of detail in studying its
impact as well as the industry’s attitude to self-assessment based on business best
practice. The basic aim of this chapter of the study and the questionnaire exercise
contained within is to attempt an assessment of the industries attitude towards a
safety management tool that is based on business (TMSA).
At the very beginning of this task the main difficulties facing this research were two
fold, firstly, the incomparable availability of written work on ISM Code and TMSA.
While the ISM Code naturally received much greater attention and in-depth analysis
the TMSA on the other hand did not receive comparable analysis or research efforts.
Secondly, the availability of data for this research, TMSA is a sensitive issue
(commercially). Subsequently, (based on the author’s personnel experience- in
particular while carrying out this exercise) many will consider it against their
commercial interest to pass judgment on, or criticise any, aspects of the guidance. In
addition, submitted self-assessment data to OCIMF is confidential together with any
detailed criteria used by specific oil majors on their selection process.
Any attempt to assess TMSA in the same manner as several parties, as touched upon
previously, assessed the ISM Code will prove to be extremely. Mejia (2001)
commented on his approach to assess the ISM performance by stating that the nonprescriptive nature of that Code ensures that each SMS is tailor-fitted to the
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particular shipping company. On the other, it presents a challenge for assessment
and evaluation. (Mejia, 2001).
Despite the fact that the pervious argument might also be applicable to TMSA, the
author is of the opinion that approaching TMSA in the same manner will prove to be
even more difficult due to a number of reasons. Few issues that come straight to
mind and are worthy of being considered are:
1- TMSA is a management tool that shares many “difficult to measure” objectives
as the ISM Code; TMSA might even be proven to be even more difficult to
measure since it has built upon the ISM Code and it is difficult to separate the
effects of the Code from those of TMSA.
2- TMSA mainly applies to a sector of the tanker industry, though data collection
might seem a trouble-free exercise, it is in the opinion of the author that such an
exercise will be proven to be difficult. Due to the confidentiality and commercial
sensitivity nature of TMSA data.
3- If an approach is taken to study the effectiveness or the impact of TMSA on a
scale similar to previously mentioned studies conducted on the ISM Code then
that would require considerable resources.
4- Findings or conclusions resulting from such a study would very likely share the
same limitations with the findings of ISM Code studies.
However, this study has the clear advantage of use of the available in-depth studies
on a somewhat similar issue (impact of the ISM Code on the shipping industry).
Additionally, the reference to the ISM Code has formed a basis for a better
understanding of any conclusions obtained.
Realizing that this study is limited by many factors both in the methodology and
scope, it is of importance to summarise the main limiting factors of this study as
follows:
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1- Although there was a use of objective data in earlier chapters (ITERTANKO
benchmarking database), this study is largely based on professionals’ subjective
opinions.
2- This study is not a comprehensive as has been explained earlier and will be
further explored in this chapter, only selected issues were analysed and discussed
in this study.
3- Even if this paper is attempting to comparatively assess two different
management tools, the descriptive parts together with a fair share of the data
analysis is (naturally) not considering the ISM Code and TMSA on the same
level.
4- Analysis to data collected throughout the questionnaire exercise has been only
descriptively in this paper. Even though established statistical methods have been
applied to some key results; other specific limitations to suggested conclusions or
observations are stipulated where appropriate.
Some other data sources were used as well in this paper, such as benchmarking data
from INTERTANKO, survey results from social networks and facts and figures from
companies or organisations experience with TMSA in particular.

5.2. Data Collection

The purpose of this section of the study is to flag up some issues of limitation as well
as some findings that have resulted from the questionnaire exercise. All figures and
tables reported in this section have been generated as a result of the questionnaire
exercise.
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5.2.1.

Questionnaire design:

The questionnaire started with an introduction on the subject of the survey followed
by few words assuring the respondents of the confidentiality of their contribution and
the anonymity that will be strictly maintained. Additionally, respondents were
assured that the aim of the questionnaire and any subsequent use of responses would
be strictly for academic purposes. The emphasis on the anonymity of the responses
and the purpose, use of data was driven by the sensitivity of the issue as described in
earlier chapters of this study.
The total number of questions (which was indicated at the start of the questionnaire)
was 22 questions. The first two questions, relating to Gender and age of the
respondents, were utilized at the start of the questionnaire as leading questions only.
These two questions (results are produced in figures 16 and 17) were aimed at
gathering information on the profile of respondents. They were not used in any data
analysis in terms of grouping or cross-referencing results.

Figure 16 Gender distribution

Figure 17 Age distribution

In order to encourage responding to the questionnaire, it was electronic based and
designed so that there was no need for respondents to input any text to answer the
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questions. Other than if respondents choose to add comments to question 22, answers
of questions 1-7 involved a selection from a dropdown menu and questions 8-22
involved selection by single computer mouse click.
Furthermore, questions 3 to 7 were aimed at finding out more detailed profile of
respondents, these questions were relative to the area of this study. The collected data
was used in grouping, correlation, cross tabulation and other descriptive statistics
used in this study. Detailed analysis of the profile of respondents is provided in
appendix (B).
The following list provides justification behind the inclusion of some leading
questions (questions 3 to 7) as well as a brief description of the use of there
responses in the data analysis:

•

Question 3 was included to find out the current professional background of the
respondent. Even though 10 options where given as a response, the analysis of
these responses were grouped as two groups, “shipping company” background
and “non-shipping company” background. Having as much as 10 options
provided a clearer picture of the profile of respondents while grouping them into
two groups allowed a comparison between the “audience” of TMSA and the ISM
as well as those who have an active part in the marine industry but not directly
involved in the daily “commercial” management of ships.

•

Question 4 was included to attain the level of seagoing experience of
respondents; therefore, in the analysis it was scaled from 1 to 5 according to the
level of seagoing experience of the respondent. Although that was again a
positive addition to the profile of respondents, further analysis of response to this
question, mainly by comparing and grouping responses, did not yield any
constructive results or observations to be reported in this study.
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•

Question 5 was included to find out if responders were involved in the shorebased management of ships and if that included management of tankers or not.
The reason behind including that question is to find out how would the answers
of companies involved with the confirmation to TMMSA and varies from that of
others.

•

In the same manner, question 6 was a scale from 1 to 5 indicating the level of
experience with the ISM Code, the analysis of this question grouped responses in
4 groups as follows:
o 1st group simply have no management capacity over ISM.
o 2nd group had a management capacity over ISM Implementation during
the last 3 years. (Those respondents were involved with ISM
implementation when TMSA fully introduced)
o 3rd group had a management capacity over ISM Implementation during
the last 3 to 6 years. (Those respondents had a management capacity over
ISM implementation and most likely have experienced the introduction of
TMSA as well.)
o 4th group had a management capacity over ISM Implementation during
the last 6 to 10 years. (Those respondents had management capacity over
ISM implementation for a number of years predating the introduction of
TMSA.)
Note: The motive behind choosing this time frame was based on the date of
introducing TMSA to the industry.

•

Question 7 was a 4-point scale to find out the level of involvement with TMSA
guidelines since that the industry experience with TMSA does not exceed 5
years.
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The corner stones of the questionnaire were Questions 8 and 9; they were introduced
to measure the over all attitudes of respondents towards the two management tools.
Mainly these two questions were used as variables for correlations and cross
tabulation for different groups of respondents grouped according to answers for
previous questions as described earlier.
The scale of question 8 referring to respondents’ opinion on the positive impact of
ISM on the shipping industry, the 5-point scale were very effective, effective,
neutral, ineffective and very ineffective. On the other hand, gauging the respondents
attitude to TMSA in question 9 was on 3-point scale (excluding respondents with no
opinion on TMSA), the motives behind this arrangement are:
1- To compare the results with data obtained from a public social network on
the same question.
2- Respondents will continue to offer their opinion on specific areas of TMSA
at the following questions.
Figure 18 illustrates the time frame this paper is involved in with reference to the
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Figure 18 Examined time-span of study

Furthermore, questions 10 to 21 were 5-point “Likert scale” questions with the
following range:
1- Strongly agree

2- Agree

3- Neutral
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4- Disagree

5- Strongly disagree

This arrangement has enabled further analysis of the responses as will be detailed
later in this study. However, the author is assuming that respondents choosing the
option neutral to many of the statements in the questionnaire are choosing not to take
a position on the statement, this is a major assumption in this exercise.

5.2.2.

Questionnaire distribution.

A large number of invitations to participate in the survey were sent to individual email addresses. It was difficult to keep track of the total number of invitations but the
direct invitations sent by the author were 1643 e-mail invitations, the following
means were adapted to distribute the questionnaire:

•

The majority of invitations were sent via an automatic generated invitation
from the server where the author using an e-mail list from e mails gathered
from shipping directories and published e-mail addresses of various
organizations, such as, maritime and flag state administrations, classification
societies,

inter

governmental

organizations

and

Non-governmental

Organizations.

•

Personal e mail invitations sent to individuals 20% of whom identified with
the Author but the rest did not as there e-mails where obtained from
published presentation on TMSA, conferences proceedings or web based
social networks of professionals such as http://network.tankeroperator.com/
and http://network.thedigitalship.com/.

•

Some participants as well forwarded invitations but there is no track as to
their number.
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However, the number of invitations accepted is as follows:
•

Number of invitations accepted through the survey server 283

•

Number of invitations accepted through personnel contact 103

•

Total number of invitations accepted

386

5.3. General comments on responses to questioner

The date filtering was conducted in several stages; the first stage was the rejection of
some entries due to a number of reasons as per table 2:
Table 2 Initial data filtering
(Ignored Data entries)

Justification
Failure to provide an answer to any of the question

Count
2

Single answer provided

6

Answers provided to leading questions only (questions1 to 7)

13

Total

21

Total number of data entries accepted

365

In order to have a better presentation of the questions, it was decided to spread the
questions over two WebPages but a total 89 out of 369 respondents have failed to
move to the second page of the questionnaire to complete it. The following
tabulation is an attempt to analyze the cause behind losing 89 valuable responses,
which represents 24% of the total number of responses received.
The nest table demonstrates one of many attempts to categories the respondents
whom did not proceed to the next page of the questionnaire, the table does not show
any significant findings. Even respondents answering (no opinion on TMSA)
proceeded to offer valuable answers to the rest of the questionnaire; the author fails
to offer an explanation to that oversight.
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Table 3 Count of respondents whom failed to proceed to the 2nd page.
(Out of the total number of respondents within same group)
nd
Groups of responses failing to proceed to 2 page
Count
No opinion on TMSA (Q9)
28
No answer to Q9
5
No answer to Q8
6
No answer to Q7
3
Involved with TMSA at some level (Q7)
32

Total
82
9
9
9
164

Percentage

No management capacity over ISM (Q6)

36

133

29%

Not involved in shore management of ships (Q5)

36

131

27%

No seafaring experience (Q4)

40

113

35%

34%
55%
66%
33%
19%

It might be possible that question 9 which was the last question on page one was in
fact the first question on TMSA at the same time, this might have suggested to
respondents who did not notice the page number or the number of questions that this
was the last question. On the other hand, only 12% of respondents have answered all
22 questions but 95% of respondents have answered 21 questions, i.e. more than
95% of the questionnaire.
The author has attempted to contact some responders with very interesting comments
offered in question 22 of the questionnaire in an attempted to further explore their
views and opinions but have failed to grant their permission to be quoted on their
opinions or experience.
Some questions had only few and basic answers available to respondents, which may
not have offered a good range of options for the responder to choose from.
Respondents’ answers may have been better placed somewhere between the options
provided to them, e.g. question asked if the respondent believed that TMSA had a
positive impact on the tanker industry, the available options were:
1- Yes definitely

2- Possibly

3- A lot of trouble with no real benefit

4- No opinion on TMSA
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The respondent’s might have wished to express his disagreement with the positive
impact of TMSA but not as strongly as stating that it was a lot of trouble for no real
benefit.
The data has been analysed statistically in a descriptive manner only, the following is
the descriptive statistics used in this paper, graphic representation of data is used for
most statistics. Only strongest correlation values observed are reported in this section
of the study.
5.4. Examination of results

During this Examination, the text in blue colour will indicate respondents comment
while the green coloured text will be used for questions of the questionnaire.

5.4.1.

Respondents’ view on the value of the comparative

assessment

At the start of this endeavour, it was apparent that some sort of explanation as to the
nature of the comparative assessment nature of this study was necessary; this was
fully explored at earlier chapters of this study. Nevertheless, it was felt important to
assess if respondents share this view or not, in other words, based on the respondents
own “knowledge” experience with the ISM code and TMSA, was it “fundamentally”
feasible to attempt a comparative assessment of two totally different management
tools?
The earlier responses to that question were encouraging; the early responses
supported the feasibility of such study. Nevertheless, It is clear from some comments
received during the questionnaire exercise that some respondents opposed this view;
some respondents (10%) have refused the suggestion that these management tools
are comparable on the two level addressed, i.e. approach and effect. The following
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comment from a respondent maintain the latter view, the respondent commented that
“ISM and TMSA are not directly comparable as ISM is mandatory while TMSA is in
theory not”.
From the previous comment and some others received, it was clear that the main
objection on the nature of this study was based on the fact that the ISM Code is
mandatory instrument while TMSA is a voluntary tool. While that is true it, the
objection was on “direct comparison” between the two and a total of 58 % of
respondents are in favour of the nature of this study. A comment from a respondent
in favour of this approach stated that “Best industry practices of TMSA tie in nicely
with continuous improvement concept of ISM. It is not the ISM Code or TMSA that
needs improvement as much as the tanker operator's commitment to its spirit and the
commercial benefits that accrue from such commitment”
The previously reported figures are based on the respondents’ agreement with the
following statement “TMSA is a voluntary safety management tool that can be
compared in its approach or in its effect on tanker industry to the implementation of
ISM”, it is observed that 52% of respondents agree to the statement while
6%strongly agree as per figure 19.

Figure 19 Total responses to (Q 17)
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Figure 20 Grouped response to Q 17 (1st attempt)

In the above analysis, the results described are for all responses to the question. In an
attempt to further analyse if that statement will be stronger supported by any group
of respondents, the support to the previous statement was cross tabulated and
graphically represented with responses from questions 9 and 8 describing the rating
of the positive impact of the ISM Code and TMSA on the shipping industry
respectively, the following results where observed:
Taking a sample of 267 respondents whom have answered both questions it is
observed that there is a weak positive linear correlation between responses to
both questions (correlation value of +0.17), i.e. it is likely that support to the
notion that ISM Code and TMSA both had a comparable impact or effect on
the tanker industry. Figure 21 represents graphically the cross-referencing.
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Figure 21 Grouped response to Q 17 (2nd attempt)

In another attempt, taking a sample of 216 responses offering an answer to both this
statement and a rating of the positive impact of TMSA it was observed that a
somewhat stronger linear correlation value of +0.24 exist (still in the weak category).
In other words, comparing the previous two observations, the majority of agreement
to this statement comes from a comparable two majorities, (30%) of respondents
with an answer of “effective” to the positive impact of the ISM code and (33%) from
respondent with an answer of “yes, definitely” when asked on the positive impact of
TMSA on the tanker industry.
Furthermore, analysing the level of support to the previous statement from 3 different
groups involved in the shore based management of ships categorised by involvement
in the management of tankers is as represented in figure 22.
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Figure 22 Grouped response to Q 17 (3rd attempt)

Noticeably, the majority of support to the previous statement is attributed to
respondents involved in the shore management of tankers only. Additionally, no
linear correlation was found between the time spent in a management capacity over
ISM Code and result of rating to the previous statement. Similarly, no correlation
was found between support of the previous statement and organisational background,
seafaring experience level or experience level in a management capacity over ISM
implementation of respondents.
Admittedly, a strong weakness in the previous analysis is in the statement itself, the
statement stipulates that the ISM Code and TMSA are comparable in impact or
approach but it does not specify in which one of these regards. As reported by some
respondents, this statement was subject to interpretation to a large degree in addition
to the inclusion of two options in the statement (approach or impact), which implies
that agreement – or disagreement - to the statement could be referenced to approach,
impact or both, this oversight fortunately was not repeated in other statements in the
questionnaire.
Nevertheless, it is worth reporting that the strongest support to the comparative
assessment nature of this study comes from respondents whom are involved in the
management of tankers, this could be attributed to the level of practical experience
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with TMSA. Indeed, mere theoretical awareness of TMSA and practical experience
with TMSA are two deferent levels of knowledge, that could explain the support of
the comparative assessment nature of this study that comes from respondents whom
are involved in the management of tankers, i.e. assumingly, respondents whom have
had practical experience with TMSA.

5.4.2.

Positive impact of safety management tools

It is necessary at this stage to explore the overall attitude of respondents towards the
ISM Code and TMSA. Starting with the ISM Code, the general response to the
positive impact of the ISM Code was obtained by asking respondents “How effective
would you rate the positive impact of the ISM code on the Shipping industry?” The
general results based on a total response from 350 respondents were as per figure23.

Figure 23 Total response to (Q 8)

With regard to the positive impact of TMSA on the tanker industry, respondents
were asked the following question: “Do you believe TMSA had a positive impact on
the tanker industry? “The general results based on a total response from 350
respondents were as per figure 24.
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Figure 24 Total response to (Q 9)

As there are many interpretations as to what constitutes a strong support, or for that
matter a strong disagreement, the author’s attempts to cross reference general
response to questions 8 and question 9 with respondents’ agreement (or
disagreement) with provided statements in the questionnaire are produced in
appendix (C).

5.4.3.

Application of TMSA principles to non-tankers

Within the context of this survey it was considered appropriate to try to establish
whether respondents are of the opinion that the principles of TMSA are applicable or
expandable to include other industries, i.e. industries other than the tanker industry.
Therefore, respondents were asked to rate their support to the following statement:
“other industries could benefit from the implementation of a safety management tool
such as TMSA for non-tankers”. The total response of 217 respondents to that
statement is illustrated in figure 25.

Figure 25 Total response to (Q 13)
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It was observed that a total of 62% of respondents either agree or strongly agree with
that statement. However, as illustrated in figure 26, the majority of the support to that
statement is a attributed to respondents involved in the management of both tankers
and other types of vessels. This category of respondents is probably the most suitable
category of respondents to comment on such a statement. That is because this group
of respondents are most likely involved with the voluntary confirmation to TMSA as
well as mandatory compliance with the ISM, both on tankers and other types of
vessels.

Figure 26 Grouped response to (Q 13)

5.4.4.

Implementation of safety management tools in an new

company
Clearly the introduction of a safety management tool to a new company rather than
to an established one is going to have a bearing on its aptitude to comply or confirm
to this management tool. Based on comments documents in TMSA conference
proceedings, especially those held at the early days when TMSA was first
introduced, it was considered appropriate to test the respondents’ view on whether
TMSA in its present form, keeping in mind the amendments introduces in the second
edition, would stand the test of being

77

Analysing the data collected from responses to the following statement “TMSA is
easier to implement on a new company rather than on an established company”; the
general response from 269 respondents was observed as per figure 27.

Figure 27 Total response to (Q 9)

Nevertheless, in an attempt to further investigate these responses, data was grouped
according to responses to questions 5, 6, 8 and 9, no correlation was found during
that analysis and no observation is to be reported. However, it was observed that the
majority of disagreement with the previous statement is attributed to respondents
whom have indicated that they had a management capacity over the ISM Code for
the last 6 to 10 years, i.e. respondents whom have been involved in the management
of the ISM Code in their organisations prior to the introduction of TMSA and after
that introduction as well.
On the other hand, considering the other two groups as per figure 28, the level of
agreement with the previous statement is not substantial but they are only slightly on
the agreement side. The most probable explanation for such an observation is that
respondents from the first group are more experienced with the safety management
in their organisations, they have witnessed the introduction of TMSA while they
when there involvement with the management of the ISM Code in their organisation
was established, therefore, it is at least apparent that in their view, implementing
TMSA on a new company or an established one is
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Figure 28 Grouped response to (Q 17)

An apparent weakness in the reported observation is that it is not conclusive whether
respondents whom did not support the previous statement are of the view that the
absolute opposite is true, i.e. whether they are of the view that TMSA is harder to
implement on a new company rather than to an established one. Although that is
unlikely, analysis of the previous statement does not provide any conclusive
evidence to that effect.
5.4.5.

Direct general comparison

This section of the examination of results offers a descriptive analysis of selected
aspects that were directly compared between the ISM Code and TMSA.
Respondents’ attitude towards these selected issues is presented in this section.

5.4.5.1.

Businesses best practice

The first selected aspect of this direct comparison between the two management tools
was a test of the respondents’ opinion on the simplicity of the practical application
the basis of these tools in general terms. In other words, since the ISM Code is
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fundamentally generic regulations applicable to all, while TMSA is a more specific
tool based on businesses best practice, which one of them (in the opinion of
respondents) is easier to follow?
For that reason, respondents were asked to rate their support to the following
statement “Implementing clear guidance based on businesses best practice is easier
to follow than generic regulations”. A good majority of 78% out of a total of 257
respondents were in agreement with that statement as demonstrate in figure 29.

Figure 29 Total response to (Q 14)

Interestingly, after further analysis, there was a close agreement between three
groups of respondents (as per figure 30); the first group is respondents whom have
indicated that they have a management capacity over the ISM Code for the last 3
years, the second group indicated that they had a management capacity for the last 3
to 6 years while the third group indicated that they had a management capacity over
the ISM Code in their organisation for the last 6 to 10 years.
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Figure 30 Grouped response to (Q 14)

Nevertheless, it is of some limitation that the wording of the previous statement was
of a very general nature. It was anticipated that analysis of response to such a general
statement would provide a picture of the overall assessment of the ease of practical
compliance with the two management tools. However, the response to the previous
statement does not provide any reasoning behind either agreement or disagreement.
On the other hand, respondents’ level of support to other statements in the
questionnaire would provide an insight into the motivation behind the level of
support to the previous statement.

5.4.5.2.

Structure of the management tool

As discussed in earlier chapters of this study, the structure of TMSA is a major
aspect of its approach to safety management, whither the approach of TMSA is
actually more structured than the ISM Code is the aspect that will be tested in this
part of the study. Therefore, respondents to the questionnaire were asked to rate their
agreement to the following statement “The approach of the TMSA is more structured
and methodical than the ISM Code”, general response of 376 responses to the
question indicates that 52% of responses agree while a considerable 42% responded
neutral to the this statement as per figure 31.
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Figure 31 Total response to (Q 10)

In further analysing the response to that question, it was surprisingly observed that as
per figure 32, respondents whom indicated that in their view the ISM Code was
effective in its positive impact on the shipping industry have largely agreed with the
statement. Respondents whom responded that TMSA had a positive impact on the
tanker industry also mirrored this result.

Figure 32 Grouped response to Q 10 (1st attempt)

Therefore, even if the general response to that statement indicated that there is a
substantial percentage of respondents whom did not wish to take a position on that
statement, further analysis indicates that the degree of agreement with the previous
statement increases among respondents whom are in the view that both the ISM
Code and TMSA had a positive impact on the shipping industry (or tanker industry
in the case of TMSA). This result is illustrated in figure 33.

82

Figure 33 Grouped response to Q 10 (2nd attempt)

5.4.5.3.

Self assessment

Another broad and general statement that was introduced in the questionnaire was
asking respondents to rate their support of whether an Internal audit of SMS is better
than self-assessment in TMSA. It was considered that those two totally different
exercises are in-house corner stones of continues improvement aspects of the
implementation of the ISM Code and TMSA. The aim of the generality of that
statement is to obtain an over all picture of the respondents attitude towards the
internal audit exercise as compared to the self-assessment exercise of TMSA.
However, it was observed that the general response of 272 respondents to that
statement was lower than the number of general responses to other statements in the
questionnaire. In addition, analysis to the general response to that statement appears
to suggest that the majority of respondents were reluctant to take a position on that
statement as per figure 34.
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Figure 34 Total response to (Q 20)

Further analysis of that response by exploring the results of responses according to
whether their managed fleet includes tankers or not or according to their degree of
experience with the ISM Code, the picture does not change in any significant way as
per figures 35 and 36.

Figure 35 Grouped response to Q 20 (1st attempt)

Figure 36 Grouped response to Q 20 (2nd attempt)
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Although many attempts were undertaken to explore these results in many other
ways, such as, grouping response according to their sea going experience or
organisational background, the author was not able to reach any significant results,
nor was he able to attain any grounds on why the majority of respondents were
reluctant to take a position on that statement.
However, a possible explanation would be that even if the majority of respondents
supported the approach of this questionnaire, i.e. its comparative assessment
approach between two totally different management tools, it is of some difficulty to
comparatively asses practical exercises required by them in general terms.

5.4.5.4.

Impact on good operators

As reported in earlier chapters, oil majors were one of the first organisations to push
forward for the industry to comply with the ISM Code, nevertheless, since it was also
reported that the ISM Code had a good impact on good operators, it was considered
appropriate to attain of the same applies to TMSA. That is because even if the TMSA
is theoretically voluntary, it is very difficult for tanker operators to be considered for
charter by oil majors if they did not confirm to TMSA.
Therefore, following on from what has just been explained, respondents were asked
to rate their agreement with the following statement: “ISM had a good impact on
good operators; the same applies to TMSA”. The general response from 270
respondents to that statement indicated that a majority of 72% of respondents were in
agreement with that statement as per figure 37.
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Figure 37 Total response to (Q 16)

Considering this result, it appears that almost two thirds of respondents were in
agreement with the previous statement. This observed result is a strong vote of
confidence for the suggestion that although the ISM Code and TMSA are
fundamentally different, the positive attitude of good operators does not differentiate
between minimum legislative requirements or voluntary management systems. The
quality management of those operators will make a positive use of such instruments.

5.4.5.5.

Level of details in safety management tools

An apparent major deference between the ISM Code and TMSA is the level of detail
in each one of these management tools. Therefore, it was considered appropriate to
examine the respondents’ evaluation of such a difference in the level of details as
well as the merits of incorporate a higher level of details in safety management tools.
This assessment was preformed on three levels, the first level was in reference to the
guidance published by IMO on compliance and implementation of the ISM Code.
Although these guidelines are not legally binding, they were introduced to encourage
a uniform interpretation of the code (as discussed previously) and therefore, naturally
encompass a larger degree of detail than the code itself.
For that reason, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the following
statement: “The level of detail in TMSA can be matched with Guidance published by
the IMO on compliance and implementation of the ISM Code”. It was observed that
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the general response from 270 respondents indicated that 49% of respondents are in
agreement with that statement as per figure 38.

Figure 38 Total response to (Q 19)

However, it was also observed that 39% of respondents did not take a position on the
prevouis statement. This considerable percentage could be attriubted the different
nature of the details contained in the IMO guidance to ISM implementation and
TMSA. Again, after further analysis, it was obsereved that the majority of support to
that statement is atributed to respondents involved in the management of tankers and
other types of ships as well as per figure 39. Nevertheless, this group of respondents
also represent the strongest disagreement compared to the other two groups, therfore,
this result is not significanlty different from the general response recived for that
statement.

Figure 39 Grouped response to (Q 19)

The second investigated level of this analysis was concerned with the merits of the
inclusion of a higher level of detail in management tools. Since the compliance with
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the spirit of the regulation rather than turning them into a paper exercise is the very
essence of success of the management tool (as discussed earlier) it was considered
necessary to examine the respondents view on whether an increased level of detail
(or decreased level of ambiguity) will increase the chances of compliance with the
spirit of the management tool.
Therefore, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the following
statement “Increased level of detail in regulations concerning safety management
increases the chances of compliance with the spirit of the regulations”. The general
response from 267 respondents indicated that the level of agreement with that
statement is somewhat stronger that the level of agreement with the test on the first
level as per figure 40.

Figure 40 Total response to (Q 21)

However, it was observed that the general response to that statement had a
considerably less percentage of respondents in the “Neutral” category as per figure
21. Additionally, further analysis revealed that the group that contributed the most to
the support of that statement is the group of respondents involved in the management
of tankers only. Evidently, the majority of respondents involved in management of
tankers only are in favour of greater level of details in management tools.

88

Figure 41 Grouped response to (Q 21)

Nonetheless, the previously reported observation should be considered together with
the results observed with the test of the third level, which asked respondents to rate
their agreement with the following statement “The TMSA is a management tool that
is subject to interpretation by vetting inspectors as much as the ISM code is subject
to interpretation, by Auditors”. Although, as per figure 42, the general response from
269 respondents to the statement indicates that 57% of responses either agree or
strongly agree, the agreement is almost equally shared between all three groups of
respondents as per figure 43. It is feasible to comment that the general majority, no
matter if they were involved in the management of takers or not, were of the opinion
that the real benefit of a greater level of detail in safety management tools is to
improve in their own performance rather than improve the outcome of external
vetting or audits.

Figure 42 Total response to (Q 18)
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Figure 43 Grouped response to (Q 18)

5.5. The ISM Code and TMSA coexistence
Since the questionnaire considered two management tools where one of the (TMSA)
was considered as an aid to compliance with the other (the ISM Code), and also since
this questionnaire indicated the level of experience of respondents with the ISM
Code, it was considered appropriate to explore if respondents were of the opinion
that TMSA did actually serve as an aid to compliance with the ISM Code.
Therefore, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the following simple,
yet direct statement: “Confirming to TMSA is an aid to compliance with ISM”. The
general response from 241 respondents indicated that 67% of respondents agree with
that statement as per figure 44.

Figure 44 Total response to (Q 15)
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However, the highest level of agreement with that statement is attributed to
respondents whom indicated that they were involved in the management of the ISM
Code for the last 6-10 years as per figure 45. Since this group of respondents is the
one that had the longest experience with the ISM Code including some years prior to
the introduction of TMSA, it is to some degree valuable to report that TMSA was an
aid to compliance with the ISM Code, particularly to respondents involved in that
compliance prior to the introduction of the ISM Code.

Figure 45 Grouped response to (Q 15)

5.6. The way forward

During the questionnaire exercise respondents were asked if they agree with the
following statement “TMSA is the way forward for the shipping industry to move
beyond minimum compliance attitude in relation to safety management and
environment protection”. General response to the question indicates that 68% of
responses either agree or strongly agree with that statement as per figure 46.
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Figure 46 Total response to (Q 11)

However, by exploring the relation ship between the support of that statement and
the level of believe in the effectiveness of the ISM Code and TMSA respectively, the
following observations were made:

Figure 47 Grouped response to Q 11 (1st attempt)

As per figure 47, the agreement of respondents with the statement is proportioned to
their rating of the positive impact of the ISM Code on the shipping industry by a
positive correlation value of +0.32. Furthermore, the agreement of respondents with
the statement is proportioned to their rating of the positive impact of the TMSA on
the tanker industry by a stronger correlation value of +0.42.
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Figure 48 Grouped response to Q 11 (2nd attempt)

It was observed that respondents supporting that TMSA had a positive impact on the
shipping industry support the concept that it is the way forward for the shipping
industry to move beyond minimum compliance more than respondents agreeing with
the positive impact of the ISM Code.

5.7. Practical suggestions for improvement of safety management

As a result of the literature review conducted for this study, the author was tempted
to examine the respondents view on selected issue that are closely related to the
practicality of this study as well as practical propositions for future improvements of
the impact of safety management tools on the shipping industry as a whole.
Therefore, respondents were asked to in the last question of the questionnaire the
following question: “how could we improve on the ISM Code in terms of compliance
with lessons learned from reaction of the tanker industry to TMSA”. Response to this
question was a choice of four options; respondents were able to chose make more
than one choice, hence, the large number of responses received for this question (314
total response). Additionally, option four was an invitation to comment on the issue.
Respondents accepted that indentation to comment in option four but have largely
commented on the subject of the whole study rather than on the issue of indicated in
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this individual question. 21% of respondents offered valuable comments in option
four.
Nevertheless, option one was a statement that read “We cannot improve on ISM
implementation with lessons learned from the TMSA, as TMSA has been appropriate
to the tanker industry only”. This statement is concerned with the respondent opinion
on any limitation of his views or experience with TMSA, since TMSA has been
appropriate to the tanker industry alone.
The observed result indicated in figure 49 demonstrates that only a minority of
respondents (8%) have attached such a limitation to their views and experience of
TMSA, i.e. the majority of respondents are of the view that even though TMSA has
been appropriate to the tanker industry, their views (especially those expressed in the
questionnaire exercise) can be generalised to include other industries.
The second statement provided in the question was concerned with the IMO
guidelines on ISM implementation, although these guidelines have been addressed in
earlier questions in the questionnaire, it was considered necessary to examine the
respondents view on whether these “Guidelines for the implementation of ISM code
issued by the IMO could benefit from the TMSA systematic approach”. The observed
result indicated that the majority of respondents (44%) are of the opinion that
business best practice is an approach of some merit to be adopted for guidelines to
the implementation of legislative tools.
The third statement provided in the question was closely related to the second one,
the second statement tests respondents’ views on the adoption of guidelines to the
implementation to the ISM Code in an approach similar to the business best practice
guidelines (measured by KPIs) of TMSA even if these guidelines should be
applicable to the whole shipping industry. Therefore, respondents to the following
statement: “ISM code applies to all shipping companies so the level of detail in
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TMSA cannot be adopted in the guidelines for implementation of the ISM Code”
were only moderately in support of such statement, only 28 % of respondents are of
the opinion that such a level of detail can not be adopted in a guidelines to a
legislative tool.

Figure 49 Total response to (Q 22)

The support of respondents to the notion that business best practice is a valuable
source for providing guidelines to compliance with the ISM Code, even if the level
of detail will naturally be greater, is evident in the response to this question.

5.8. Conclusions and Recommendations

The initial literature review related to TMSA has proven to be difficult in terms of
the availability of academic references related to the topic of this study, nevertheless,
an examination of conference proceedings related to the implementation of TMSA
has provided a valuable source on the industries attitude and reaction to TMSA.
Nevertheless, many of the issues raised in these proceedings have been addressed in
the questionnaire and individual observations were reported in this study, it is found
that the initial reaction of the industry to the introduction of TMSA varies to a
considerable extent from the current attitude towards the adoption of business best
practice as a basis for safety management tools.
However, the coexistence of common “legislative” rules and regulation concerning
safety management as well as guidelines based on business best practice is an
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integral part of the formula towards a proper adoption of these legislative tools. This
is to prevent the ship from becoming a library of broad rules and standards written in
the most generic format possible taking the shear size of varieties in the shipping
industry into consideration, although the guidelines on the implementation of the
ISM Code do go some way into providing a common interpretation of the provisions
of the code, relating these guidelines to practical measures, which have been tried
and tested by industry leaders, is a mechanism worthy of consideration.
Although the questionnaire exercise undertaken for the benefit of this study was
fortunate to have had a considerable participation, and some observation of great
interest were made, some limitations to that approach has been identified in chapter
five of this study. Future studies addressing similar scopes could benefit from taking
these limitations into consideration, in particular the undertaking of a pilot survey
prior to the distribution of the main survey. Future researchers are advised to keep in
mind the industries reluctance to be quoted on their criticism of a commercially
sensitive issue as the confirmation to TMSA.
Although the conclusion of every issue addressed in the questionnaire exercise has
been examined together with any limitations attached to such conclusions; the
following list provide the most significant findings of the questionnaire exercise:
1. The number of responses received during the questionnaire exercise, together
with the diversity observed in demographic of respondents, attaches a special
significance to the results observed.
2. The general attitude of respondents towards the effective impact of both the ISM
Code and TMSA has been positive. Although the industries attitude towards the
implementation of the ISM Code has been addressed in other studies, the
relationship between the respondents’ attitude towards the ISM Code and TMSA
explored in this study is equally significant.
3. Despite the early difficulties experienced in attempting to comparatively assess
two totally different management tools, the results observed in the questionnaire
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show that respondents were largely in agreement with the approach of this study
and consequently have provided a valuable contribution to the questionnaire.
4. Generally, respondents are largely in support of adopting the principles of TMSA
to other industries, i.e. other than the oil tanker industry.
5. Data gathered has failed to provide any conclusive observation from the
respondents’ attitude towards:
5.1. Whether TMSA is easier to implement on a new company rather than on an
established company. And;
5.2. Whether internal audit of SMS is better than self-assessment in TMSA.
6. Nevertheless, respondents have attached considerable general support towards
the following aspects:
6.1. Implementing clear guidance based on businesses best practice is easier to
follow than generic regulations.
6.2. ISM had a good impact on good operators; the same applies to TMSA
6.3. Confirming to TMSA is an aid to compliance with ISM.
6.4. TMSA is the way forward for the shipping industry to move beyond
minimum compliance attitude in relation to safety management and
environment protection from ism supporters
7. Additionally, specific groups of respondents have noticeably provided stronger
support (compared to other groups within the same category) to some aspects
addressed in the questionnaire. Such as:
7.1. The particular support from respondents involved in the management of the
ISM Code in their organisations and involved in the shore based
management of ships including tankers and other types of ships to the notion
that an increased level of detail in regulations concerning safety management
increases the chances of compliance with the spirit of the regulations.
7.2. Respondents of the view that the ISM Code had a positive impact on the
shipping industry have strongly supported that the approach of TMSA is
more structured and methodical than the ISM Code.
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7.3. Respondents involved in the management of the ISM Code for the last 6 to
10 years, i.e. after the introduction of TMSA has supported that the level of
detail in TMSA can be matched with Guidance published by the IMO on
compliance and implementation of the ISM Code.
8. Last but not least, addressing a practical suggestion to improve on the current
implementation of safety management standards, respondents have generally
supported that the guidelines for the implementation of ISM code issued by the
IMO could benefit from the TMSA systematic approach
In addition, future research into this subject could quantitatively address the current
implementation of the leading and lagging safety indicators of TMSA and the ISM
Code. This type of study combined with results observed in this study could provide
an insight on how could positive attitudes to ISM and TMSA yield tangible
operational safety benefits. In other words, studying the mechanism of translating the
positive attitude of the industry towards safety management tools into operational
benefits at the sharp end.
Finally, the merits of adopting the self-assessment approach of TMSA in comparison
to the advantages of conducting an effective internal audit of the safety management
system of the company, can be closely related to the continues improvement cycles
of both TMSA and the ISM Code respectively. Nevertheless, in either case, the level
of Shore based management commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation of
individuals, at all levels, in the company and on board ships are the basis for success
in any exercise.
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International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
- FOR SAFE TRANSPORT, CLEANER SEAS AND FREE COMPETITION 08 July 2008
Our Ref.: HS-40063/1650000
TMSA 2004/2008 Gap Analysis
Introduction:
Further to the recent release of the revised Tanker Management Self Assessment (TMSA 2),
INTERTANKO has produced the following spreadsheet which aims to assist members identify
where changes have been made within the revised TMSA (2008 version), as compared with the
initial TMSA 2004 version.
Explanation:
1. Using TMSA 2004 as the base document, each element and sub-element is listed in the left
hand column on each page.
2. The right hand column on each page indicates:
! if changes have been made to the 2004 element
! if no changes have been made to the 2004 element
! if the 2004 element has been moved to another reference within TMSA 2008 without
changes
! if the 2004 element has been moved to another reference within TMSA 2008 with
changes
! The elements highlighted in yellow are changes that have been made by OCIMF which
reflect suggestions made by INTERTANKO following our letter to OCIMF requesting
consideration of various elements after consulting our TMSA working Group the
vetting Committee, Environmental Committee, and Safety technical Committee
(ISTEC).
3. The numbering system used in the spreadsheet is as follows:
! Each of the twelve elements is numbered 1 to 12
! The sub elements are numbered “.1”, “.2 “.3” etc within each element. For example,
TMSA 1A “Management, Leadership & Accountability” sub-element 2, “Safety
and environmental excellence are fully understood and supported by vessel and
shore-based management teams” is numbered “1A 2.1” in the spreadsheet.
Disclaimer
Whilst INTERTANKO has used its best endeavours to ensure this information is accurate we can
not accept any responsibility for any errors and each company should verify its own assessment
accordingly against the final TMSA 2 document.
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8. Appendix B

Examination of Demographics of responders

01) Gender
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02) Age
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03) What is your organization's role in the shipping industry?
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04) Do you have seafaring experience?
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05) Are you involved in the shore-based management of ships?
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06) Do you have management capacity over ISM implementation in your
organization?
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07) Do you have a role in TMSA in your organization?
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9. Appendix C

Unfiltered Results of Questionnaire

08) How effective would you rate the positive impact of the ISM code on
the Shipping industry?
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09) Do you believe TMSA had a positive impact on the tanker industry?

X8A!E8]12108<9!

#&#5!%-4!
#$$5!%&4!

H@AA1D<9!
)!<@0!@7!0=@;D<8!U10L!2@!=8/<!
D828]10!

,$5!$%4!

N@!@?121@2!@2!RB6)!
#(5!&4!

114

10) The approach of the TMSA is more structured and methodical than
the ISM Code?
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11) TMSA is the way forward for the shipping industry to move beyond
minimum compliance attitude in relation to safety management and
environment protection?
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12) TMSA is easier to implement on a new company rather than on an
established company?
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13) Other industries could benefit from the implementation of a safety
management tool such as TMSA for non-tankers?
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14) Implementing clear guidance based on businesses best practice is
easier to follow than generic regulations?
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15) Confirming to TMSA is an aid to compliance with ISM?
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G1A/3=88!
60=@23<9!G1A/3=88!

16) ISM had a good impact on good operators; the same applies to
TMSA?
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17) TMSA is a voluntary safety management tool that can be compared
in its approach or in it’s effect on tanker industry to the implementation
of ISM.
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18) The TMSA is a management tool that is subject to interpretation by
vetting inspectors as much as the ISM code is subject to interpretation by
Auditors?
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N8;0=/<!
G1A/3=88!

$&5!-4!

60=@23<9!E1A/3=88!

'5!$4!

19) The level of detail in TMSA can be matched with Guidance
published by the IMO on compliance and implementation of the ISM
Code?

#"'5!%-4!

#$"5!&&4!

60=@23<9!/3=88!
)3=88!
N8;0=/<!

$+5!#"4!

#%5!'4! '5!$4!
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G1A/3=88!
60=@23<9!E1A/3=88!

20) Internal audit of SMS is better than self assessment in TMSA?

#$#5!&&4!
60=@23<9!/3=88!

+"5!$(4!

)3=88!
N8;0=/<!
G1A/3=88!

'(5!$#4!

#-5!+4!

60=@23<9!E1A/3=88!

(5!$4!

21) Increased level of detail in regulations concerning safety
management increases the chances of compliance with the spirit of the
regulations?

#$,5!&,4!
60=@23<9!/3=88!
+"5!$(4!

)3=88!
N8;0=/<!

$$5!,4!

G1A/3=88!
%(5!#&4!

##5!&4!
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60=@23<9!E1A/3=88!

22) How could we improve on the ISM Code in terms of compliance
with lessons learned from reaction of the tanker industry to TMSA?
^8!I/22@0!1C?=@F8!@2!S6B!
1C?<8C820/01@2!U10L!<8AA@2A!
<8/=28E!7=@C!0L8!RB6)!/A!
RB6)!L/A!D882!/??=@?=1/08!
0@!0L8!0/2K8=!12E;A0=9!@2<9_!

$&5!+4!
('5!$#4!

,+5!$,4!

#%,5!&&4!

`;1E8<128A!7@=!0L8!
1C?<8C820/01@2!@7!S6B!I@E8!
1AA;8E!D9!0L8!SB>!I@;<E!
D828]10!7=@C!0L8!RB6)!
A9A08C/01I!/??=@/IL_!
S6B!I@E8!/??<18A!0@!/<<!
AL1??123!I@C?/218A!A@!0L8!
<8F8<!@7!E80/1<!12!RB6)!I/22@0!
D8!/E@?08E!12!0L8!3;1E8<128A!
7@=!1C?<8C820/01@2!@7!0L8!
S6B!:@E8_!
H<8/A8!:@CC820!
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10. Appendix D

Cross tabulation of general response
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Cross Tabulation of Question 8 and question 11 to 22
Count of Res
Q8
Q11
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
17
16
3
36
Strongly Agree
38
73
22
2
1
136
Agree
15
36
30
1
1
83
Neutral
1
12
1
2
16
Disagree
2
2
Strongly
Grand Total
71
137
56
5
4
273
Count of Res
Q8
Q12
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
4
11
5
20
Strongly Agree
22
34
12
2
1
71
Agree
28
46
28
1
2
105
Neutral
11
41
10
1
63
Disagree
4
2
1
1
1
9
Strongly
Grand Total
69
134
56
5
4
268
Count of Res
Q8
Q13
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
8
19
3
30
Strongly Agree
37
73
25
1
1
137
Agree
20
37
18
2
1
78
Neutral
3
7
9
1
20
Disagree
1
1
1
2
5
Strongly
Grand Total
68
137
56
5
4
270
Count of Res
Q8
Q14
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
13
22
8
43
Strongly Agree
45
89
30
4
1
169
Agree
8
25
16
1
1
51
Neutral
1
4
3
8
Disagree
2
2
Strongly
Grand Total
67
140
57
5
4
273
Count of Res
Q8
Q15
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
16
11
6
33
Strongly Agree
38
83
24
2
1
148
Agree
12
30
19
3
1
65
Neutral
3
11
7
21
Disagree
1
2
3
Strongly
Grand Total
69
136
56
5
4
270
Count of Res
Q8
Q16
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
21
16
3
40
Strongly Agree
34
94
22
2
1
153
Agree
9
23
24
1
1
58
Neutral
3
5
4
2
14
Disagree
2
2
4
Strongly
Grand Total
67
138
55
5
4
269

Count of Res
Q8
Q17
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
7
6
4
17
Strongly Agree
37
79
19
2
1
138
Agree
19
36
26
3
1
85
Neutral
6
11
4
21
Disagree
4
2
6
Strongly
Grand Total
69
136
53
5
4
267
Count of Res
Q8
Q18
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
10
12
7
29
Strongly Agree
31
67
19
4
1
122
Agree
20
43
23
1
1
88
Neutral
8
11
5
24
Disagree
3
2
5
Strongly
Grand Total
69
136
54
5
4
268
Count of Res
Q8
Q19
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
5
4
4
13
Strongly Agree
38
59
19
2
1
119
Agree
19
56
27
2
1
105
Neutral
6
16
4
1
27
Disagree
2
1
2
5
Strongly
Grand Total
68
137
55
5
4
269
Count of Res
Q8
Q20
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
11
7
1
19
Strongly Agree
21
38
6
3
1
69
Agree
24
58
36
2
1
121
Neutral
12
32
12
56
Disagree
3
1
2
6
Strongly
Grand Total
68
138
56
5
4
271
Count of Res
Q8
Q21
Very Effective Effective Neutral Ineffective Very Ineffective Grand Total
10
8
4
22
Strongly Agree
37
65
22
2
1
127
Agree
12
39
17
1
1
70
Neutral
6
20
8
2
36
Disagree
1
6
2
2
11
Strongly
Grand Total
66
138
53
5
4
266
Count of Res
Q22

Q8
Very Effective Effective Neutral Grand Total
1
4
6
7
17
2
9
20
2
31
3
1
3
1
5
Grand Total
14
29
10
53

Cross Tabulation of Question 9 and question 11 to 22
Q9
a lot of trouble with
Q11
Yes definitely
possibly
no real benefit
Strongly Agree
30
4
Agree
68
52
6
Neutral
12
28
3
Disagree
4
7
5
Strongly Disagree
1
Grand Total
114
91
15
Count of Res

Count of Res
Q12

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

9
33
33
31
5
111

10
27
31
20
2
90

Q13

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

22
67
15
8

6
45
30
9

112

90

Q20

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

8
30
41
30
4
113

8
21
41
21

Q14

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

20
75
14
3

9
63
16
4

112

92

Count of Res

Count of Res

91

Count of Res

Q15

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

21
70
13
8

8
56
20
6

112

90

Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
4
4
5
1
14
Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
6
4
2
3
15
Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
1
7
6

Grand Total
34
126
43
16
1
220

Grand Total
19
64
68
56
8
215

Grand Total
28
118
49
19
3
217

1
15

Grand Total
58
88
51
5
219

Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
4
5
4
1
1
15

Grand Total
143
34
8
1
219

Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
1
3
4
5
2
15

Grand Total
129
37
19
2
217

Count of Res
Q16

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

25
73
8
5
1
112

10
55
18
6
89

Q21

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total
Count of Res
Count of Res

10
59
20
20
1
110

8
41
27
7
6
89

Count of Res

Q17

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

11
71
19
9
2

5
49
28
8

Grand Total

112

90

Count of Res
Q18

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

15
55
27
15
1
113

9
47
28
3
2
89

Q19

Yes definitely

possibly

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Grand Total

10
53
31
15
2
111

2
49
33
7
91

Q22

Yes definitely

possibly

1
2
3
Grand Total

4
18
1
23

10
9
3
22

Count of Res

Count of Res

Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
1
6
5
2
1
15
Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
1
6
3
3
2
15
Q9
Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit

Grand Total
36
134
31
13
2
216

Grand Total
19
106
50
30
9
214

Grand Total

4
5
2
3

16
124
52
19
5

14

216

Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
2
5
5
2
1
15
Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
1
3
7
3
1
15
Q9
a lot of trouble with
no real benefit
2
1
3

Grand Total
26
107
60
20
4
217

Grand Total
13
105
71
25
3
217

Grand Total
14
29
5
48

11. Appendix E

Selected comments received

1.
TMSA is a structured management tool for the tanker industry specific. A
management tool to support ISM implementation is definitely beneficial provided it
can be moulded to apply to all ship types and sizes
2.
The effort in improving the safety of ships should focus on building a safety
culture. It is doubtful that this can only be achieved in exclusively stricter and more
detailed regulations. In the end it will only degrade into ticking of boxes. On the
other hand it is much easier for the regulators (and management) to come up with
checklists than to change the attitude towards safety
3.
A better-trained and knowledgeable mariner is more effective than a welldocumented ISM implementation.
4.

The TMSA is simply a cream on top of the ISM Code cake.

5.
There is a fundamental difference between self-assessment culture and
external audit (as in ISM). TMSA audits by oil majors defeat the concept of 'self'assessment. Best industry practices of TMSA tie in nicely with continuous
improvement concept of ISM. It is not the ISM Code or TMSA that needs
improvement as much as the tanker operator's commitment to its spirit and the
commercial benefits that accrue from such commitment.
6.
TMSA is the way forward when applied to Vetting - There is too much
duality with the tanker industries needing one agreed approach. CDI, SIRE
(including gas) is different systems and objective approach versus a more subjective
approach. ISM to a greater extent has resulted in a dumping down of the industry.
Good operator need not fear regulation and can achieve good results at anytime when
required to be audited or vetted.
7.
ISM and TMSA are not directly comparable as ISM is mandatory while
TMSA is in theory not
8.
To improve the effectiveness of the ISM or TMSA a direct links between
leading and lagging indicators must exist
9.

I will try to learn more about TMSA, because of your presentation here.

10.
ISM and TMSA will benefit good operators but bad operators are the ones
that need to be held to compliance. This will never improve until there is more
accountability and severe punitive action for substandard vessels and vessel
operators and those people who enable such substandard to exist and flourish
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11.
The objectives of both the ISM Code and the TMSA are safety and
environmental protection. While these goals are laudable, the additional layers of
resources needed to implement them add to the cost of ship operations. It would be
worthwhile to consider a single regulatory regime encompassing all ships, with
appendices for various types of ships. A conscientious ship operator is often held
hostage to excessively high standards, simply because these standards were deemed
to be the best practice. Best practices may vary from situation to situation and
practicality, logic and pragmatism are often sacrificed at the altar of mandatory
compliance.
12.
Implementing TMSA requires a lot of resources within a company. Small
ship management companies will find it difficult to comply. The ISM Code in it's
present format is good enough for shipping in general.
13.
Such kind of strict KPI to be applied must be introduced to make ship
manager comply with ISM's spirit for dry ship too
14.
TMSA focus on a series of procedures and records where auditors and
company management can see that they have adhered to what "experts" deemed as
the ideal practice to improve safety on ships. However, did the author of the TMSA
and the ISM realize the intangible costs in implementing these codes?
15.
Increasingly, we have seen a shortage of manpower ashore largely because of
the need for additional manpower to micro-manage the fleet. Empowerment of the
Master and his officers are a thing of the past.
16.
When market is very high, we see Charterers being driven by commercial
pressure to take in older tonnages. So why this emphasis on quality when Charterers
are unable to adhere to their own philosophies when the market is against them?
17.
After auditing shipping companies on behalf of Oil Major in my past job and
now that I am back into Ship Management, sad to say its the implementation of the
code and commitment from TOP management that is the missing. There would not
have been a requirement for TMSA, if ISM was being strictly followed & the ISM
auditors took a more in-depth role.
18.
TMSA is too detailed for small companies who lack experienced shore
management. For example in China where I am based TMSA is too difficult for
Chinese operators to implement. The problem is that the shore management prepares
the entire ISM documentation needed for review by vetting consultants so the ship
staff have little part in the process of implementation and its use for continuous
improvement.
19.
TMSA is a powerful tool and it offers a good operator a guide to best industry
practices. Management commitment and TMSA is a great combination for continual
improvement. Strongly feel TMSA is the way forward - a step beyond ISM.
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20.
There are three aspects which dilutes the effort of the very concept of TMSA
1. Demand of officers and crew relative to lower supply - This gives rise poor quality
crew and officers available. Which in turn makes all the effort and cost of TMSA just
paper compliance and not actual implementation on board or Shore management 2.
Owners and charterers lose out more often than not, because Oil major can accept
and reject vessels on grounds that in today’s market are difficult, e.g. - manning
matrix requirement etc 3. Cost of operating vessel increases substantially with little
to very little gain actually
21.
have been sailing on oil tankers from 1992 till 2008 and have been witness to
the ISM and TMSA introduction on ships. It would not be far from the truth to say
that many seafarers presently sailing on ships are not adequately aware of the various
provisions of the ISM Code or for that matter, the TMSA.
22.
ISM code is mostly generic, TMSA establishes " Benchmarking of
Companies" but there are no Published " Benchmarks" so there is confusion in the
industry in comparing standards. Another experience we had is that Vetting
organizations have used TMSA by feeding data into their own Computer programs to
churn out company analysis, which when we meet them face to face and explain,
their results are not reflective on the actual situation which then puts some good
operators who are honest and not blindly increasing their TMSA Numbers, at a
disadvantage. Some small operators may not require achieving the highest level in a
particular TMSA sub element, as it may not be applicable/feasible, and that also
affects operators rating from their Computer analysis results as we demonstrated to
one oil major and they agreed on that.
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